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This thesis looks into two privacy threats of cellular networks. For their opera-
tions, these networks have to deal with unique permanent user identities called
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). One of the privacy threats is
posed by a device called IMSI catcher. An IMSI catcher can exploit various
vulnerabilities. Some of these vulnerabilities are easier to exploit than others.
This thesis looks into fixing the most easily exploitable vulnerability, which is
in the procedure of identifying the subscriber. This vulnerability exists in all
generations of cellular networks prior to 5G. The thesis discusses solutions to fix
the vulnerability in several different contexts.
One of the solutions proposes a generic approach, which can be applied to any
generation of cellular networks, to fix the vulnerability. The generic approach
uses temporary user identities, which are called pseudonyms, instead of using
the permanent identity IMSI. The thesis also discusses another solution to fix
the vulnerability, specifically in the identification procedure of 5G. The solution
uses Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), and it is different from the one that has
been standardised in 5G. Our IBE-based solution has some additional advantages
that can be useful in future works. The thesis also includes a solution to fix
the vulnerability in the identification procedure in earlier generations of cellular
networks. The solution fixes the vulnerability when a user of a 5G network
connects to those earlier generation networks. The solution is a hybridisation of
the pseudonym-based generic solution and the standardised solution in 5G.
iii
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The second of the two threats that this thesis deals with is related to the stan-
dards of a delegated authentication system, known as Authentication and Key
Management for Applications (AKMA), which has been released in July 2020.
The system enables application providers to authenticate their users by lever-
aging the authentication mechanism between the user and the user’s cellular
network. This thesis investigates what requirements AKMA should fulfil. The
investigation puts a special focus on identifying privacy requirements. It finds
two new privacy requirements, which are not yet considered in the standardi-
sation process. The thesis also presents a privacy-preserving AKMA that can
co-exist with a normal-mode AKMA.
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Networks → Network properties → Network security
Security and privacy → Security services → Pseudonymity, anonymity
and untraceability
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Wireless communication technologies have been changing our world in unprece-
dented ways since the beginning of the last century. This technology has had
enormous military influence, enabling fast communication with remote and mo-
bile forces through two world wars. Wartime wireless communication systems
were based on long-range radio transmitters, and these systems did not have
enough capacity to provide telephony services to millions of users on a commer-
cial scale.
Since the 1980s, telephony services using cell-based wireless networks, known
as cellular networks, have become commercially successful. A cell is a relatively
compact land area served by at least one radio tower. Typically, a nation-wide
large land area is covered by many cells. This cell-based arrangement produces
more capacity than using a single large transmitter. This is because the same
radio frequency can be used simultaneously for multiple users as long as they are
in different cells. Cellular networks also scale well because the network capacity
to provide services to an increased number of users can be achieved by replacing
one large cell by multiple smaller cells.
Some short-ranged popular wireless technologies emerged in the 1990s. For
example, Bluetooth networks for exchanging data between two nearby devices
relieved the trouble of using many cables in a personal space, e.g., in a car.
Another example is the Wi-Fi network that enables wireless data networking
between a set of computers located nearby, e.g., inside a building.
Wireless technology has had a significant influence on society, primarily be-
cause it allows communication between devices without the need for a physical
wire/cable, which allows users to move around freely. However, for the same
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reason, wireless communication poses challenges that are of lesser concern in
wire-based communication.
In a wire-based communication system, if an attacker wants to eavesdrop on
the message that is being communicated, the attacker needs physical access to
wires or other parts of the system. In contrast, in a wireless communication
system, the attacker can eavesdrop by listening to the radio wave. Indeed, the
information travels through the air, and anyone with an appropriate wireless
receiver can sniff the information. The attacker’s wireless receiver does not need
to be expensive.
In a wire-based communication system, the attacker would be treated with
suspicion if the attacker starts to play with communication cables in random
places. Consequently, the attacker has a higher chance of getting caught. In
contrast, using a wireless receiver is much more convenient for stealth attacks.
In short-ranged wireless communication systems like Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, the at-
tacker’s wireless receiver can be within meters or tens of meters from the sender or
receiver. Therefore, the attacker can carry the wireless receiver inconspicuously,
e.g., in his backpack, without creating any suspicion.
Things become even easier for the attacker in the cellular networks due to
their long-range radio wave. In cellular networks, eavesdropping can be done by
placing the wireless receiver in an unnoticeable place chosen by the attacker, e.g.,
at his home in the same town as the victim. Indeed, in first-generation cellular
networks, listening to other people’s phone calls became a popular pastime [1,
p. 4]. The infamous case of recording and publishing princess Diana’s phone call
is just one example [2].
An attacker’s goal is not always limited to eavesdropping in a passive
receiving-only manner. An attacker may actively inject carefully crafted mes-
sages in the network to cause harm to his victims, or to gain profit for himself.
This kind of attacker is called an active attacker. Such an attacker may, for exam-
ple, try to put the cost of usage incurred by himself on the bill of others. Active
attacks can be mounted in a similar stealthy manner as mentioned above using a
wireless transceiver, i.e., transmitter and receiver coupled together. In practice,
this was possible in the commercially-used first-generation cellular networks [3]
which became popular in the 1980s.
A cellular network needs to know the identity of the subscriber before provid-
ing services to a user so that the network can bill the subscriber. The network
requests the user’s device to send the identity of the subscriber. In response
to the request, the user’s device sends the subscriber’s identity to the network.
An active attacker sees opportunities in this arrangement, for example, to know
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whether a victim is at home or not. Towards that goal, the attacker sets up
a wireless transceiver near the victim’s home and sends identity requests to all
devices within the attacker’s range. If a response from the victim is received, the
attacker can infer that the victim is still at his home. Otherwise, the attacker can
conclude that the victim has either left home or switched off the device. Variants
of this kind of location-tracking attacks exist in all generations of cellular net-
works. This kind of active attack can help in a more serious offence, for example,
burglars to break in and steal from the victim’s home.
The above discussion may sound bleak and give the impression that wireless
communication systems are doomed to be vulnerable to attackers. Fortunately,
that is not the case. Introduction of the new digital radio signal (replacing
the old analogue signal) has enabled the use of cryptography (a technique used
for hiding long-distance military communication since ancient time) to secure
wireless communication. In the 1990s, the second-generation commercial cellular
networks used digital radio signal and leveraged modern cryptography to fix many
vulnerabilities, i.e., opportunities that were exploitable by attackers. Intricate
use of cryptographic mechanisms was embedded in users’ mobile phones in a
transparent manner. A user would only have to turn on his mobile phone, and
the phone would be ready to use with all its security properties without the user
noticing any interruption or delay.
However, cryptography is not the silver bullet for fixing all the exploitable
vulnerabilities of a commercial communication system. Cryptographic techniques
require additional computational and infrastructural cost, which may outweigh
the benefit of using the techniques. The design process of the security mechanisms
of a commercial communication system is guided by some pragmatic principles
that may not suggest fixing every vulnerability exploitable by some attackers.
One of these principles says that the benefit-cost ratio of fixing a vulnerability
has to be acceptable from a business point of view. The cost of fixing should be
smaller than the anticipated loss, in case the vulnerability was not fixed. Another
principle says that a system is as strong as its weakest link. This principle
stems from the phenomenon that when an attacker sees multiple exploitable
vulnerabilities to achieve his attacking goal, the attacker chooses to exploit the
vulnerability that takes the least effort. Therefore, the design process should
try to fix a vulnerability that is easier to exploit by the attacker before fixing
vulnerabilities that are more difficult to exploit.
In the standards for GSM networks, second-generation cellular networks,
which have become popular since the 1990s, many vulnerabilities have been fixed.
The effort kept attackers from succeeding in their malicious actions. For exam-
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ple, the fraud where attackers try to put their usage on the bill of others were
defeated. Also, the passive attackers were not able to eavesdrop on the com-
municated messages anymore. Both of the fixes were done using cryptographic
techniques. However, because of the pragmatic principles explained above, not
all the vulnerabilities were fixed. A fake network could still attack a victim.
In GSM, an active attacker could set up a fake network and introduce itself as
a network that a victim could trust, i.e., the attacker would try to impersonate a
legitimate network to the victim. By doing so, the attacker could do different bad
things, for example, eavesdrop on the communication done by the victim or mod-
ify the content of a text message sent by the victim or infer the presence/absence
of the victim at a location, e.g., the victim’s home. Users were left vulnerable
to fake networks because the cost of establishing a fake network was thought to
be very high. It was estimated that an attacker using a fake network against a
victim would not have enough incentive for mounting such attacks. Therefore,
the attack was considered highly unlikely, and in consequence, no protection was
developed.
Since the publication of GSM standards, the security of the cellular network
standards has been periodically re-evaluated and tightened by fixing more and
more vulnerabilities. For example, in the standards of 3G networks, which were
released in the late 1990s, the active attackers could not eavesdrop or modify
messages by using a fake network anymore. This was because before sending
or receiving any message, a user’s device, by using cryptography, could identify
whether a network was fake or not. If fake, the user’s device would just stop
communicating with the network.
However, the active attackers could still use a fake network to infer a vic-
tim’s presence at/absence from a place and breach the location privacy. This
was because a user’s device could identify a fake/legitimate network only after
the user’s device had sent the identity of the subscriber to the fake/legitimate
network. Once the fake network receives the subscriber’s identity, it already suc-
ceeds in inferring that the user is present at the nearby location. If the fake
network does not receive the subscriber’s identity, then it can infer that the user
is not nearby. Adequate protection against this kind of attack was not developed
because the cost involved in maintaining the protection mechanisms outweighed
the anticipated gain. Most of the cellular networks prior to the latest 5G network
were vulnerable to this attack.
The attack on users’ location privacy, as mentioned above, is possible be-
cause the users’ device sends a long-term identity, i.e., subscriber identity, to the
network. Indeed, if the user sent a new identity each time it identified itself,
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then the attacker would not know who is who. Please note that a user of a
cellular network may send different kinds of identities (some are more long-lived
than others) over the network. Different network standards and protocols specify
these identities. For example, some of the identities (e.g., user names, cookies)
are used at the application layer; some identities (e.g., IP addresses) are used
when routing the messages to correct destinations on the Internet. A Medium
Access Control (MAC) address is used by the user’s device in accessing Wi-Fi
networks. Also, a unique Bluetooth device address is used in Bluetooth commu-
nication. Any of these identities, if captured cleverly, can be used to infer the
presence/absence of a user at a location.
This thesis is mostly about the privacy of the user identities in cellular net-
works. Ensuring the privacy of all identities of a user in a cellular network would
require identifying and fixing all the vulnerabilities in all the relevant standards
that define those identities. Moreover, the privacy of these identities can also be
breached if an attacker can get unauthorised access to the user’s device or the
network’s premises. Dishonest insider personnel from the network’s operational
team may also cause the privacy breach of a user.
Therefore, ensuring the privacy of all identities of a user is a very complex task
with many facets. A pragmatic approach to handle the whole issue is to divide
it into many smaller parts and resolve each part separately. Such a divide and
conquer approach makes sense because the relevant vulnerabilities are arguably
too scattered to take on in a single piece of work. Designing fixes to all the
vulnerabilities in one go demands a wide range of technical skills and involves
different organisation bodies. Therefore, dividing the whole problem into parts
and solving each part separately, possibly in parallel, is pragmatic.
Fixing the vulnerabilities in the cellular network protocols should be priori-
tised because an active attacker can mount attacks against these protocols in
a less conspicuous manner (the wireless transceiver can be placed, e.g., at the
attacker’s home) than against other protocols. We propose fixes to two vulnera-
bilities related to the cellular network protocols in this thesis.
The first vulnerability has its root in the user identification protocols (the
way the user sends its identity to the network) in GSM, 3G, and LTE. All these
generations1 of cellular networks had left the weakness unresolved due to low
benefit-cost ratio [4], i.e., due to low gain in benefit in comparison with the
required cost to mitigate the weakness. The second vulnerability is relatively
1Please note that in this thesis, we limit our discussion to the most dominant cellular network
standards from each generation, i.e., GSM, 3G, LTE, and 5G.
6 1 Introduction
new and relevant only in the second phase of 5G, which has been released in July
2020. This vulnerability appears as a vulnerability in this thesis but not in the
design process of 5G. This is because we put less trust in the network than the
5G design process has. One of the reasons to put less trust in the network is the
rising trend of insider attacks, i.e., some employees within a company attack the
customer of the company [5–7]. In the following, we give a high-level overview of
these two vulnerabilities. Rigorous problem definitions are presented in Chapter
3.
The first vulnerability is related to an identity privacy threat posed by Inter-
national Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catchers. An IMSI catcher is a rogue
device with a radio interface. It impersonates a legitimate network. The IMSI
catcher’s primary goal is to infer the presence/absence of users at a location of
interest. It is called “IMSI catcher” because the most powerful attack it mounts,
to achieve this primary goal, reveals (or catches) users’ IMSI. This is the most
powerful attack because it can attack many users in parallel. The vulnerabil-
ity that the IMSI catcher exploits in this attack is in the user’s identification
procedures, and it is the first vulnerability of interest in this thesis.
The IMSI catcher also uses vulnerabilities in other procedures to achieve
similar goals. These other procedures include those that the user’s device and
the network use, to verify each other’s identity so that they are not fooled by
impostors. Vulnerabilities also exist in the procedures that the network uses to
search the user’s device for which incoming messages have arrived. Exploiting
these other vulnerabilities leads to attacks that are less powerful than the attack
that exploits the vulnerability in the identification procedure. This is because
each victim has to be targeted separately.
The techniques involved in the defence against IMSI catchers can be put into
two categories: detecting and defeating. The detecting techniques help the users
to stop communicating with the IMSI catcher or help the police to pursue the
IMSI catcher and stop it from attacking. Detecting IMSI catchers may prevent
various attacks mounted against a user. However, in many cases, the detection
alone does not prevent them from attacking the identity privacy of a user. This
is because, by the time a user can detect an IMSI catcher, the IMSI catcher
may already have tricked the user into revealing the IMSI. Also, the detectors
are not completely accurate; they may produce false positive and false negative
detection [8–10]. Defeating IMSI catchers refers to the techniques that propose
modifications in vulnerable procedures so that the IMSI catchers cannot exploit
them anymore. Therefore, techniques that defeat IMSI catchers are more effective
than techniques that use detection as a pre-requisite.
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The most easily exploitable vulnerability is in the identification procedure,
which we try to fix in this thesis. We try to fix the vulnerability by conceal-
ing the IMSI, e.g., using cryptographic measures so that the concealed IMSI is
incomprehensible to the IMSI catcher. Thus, our techniques fall under the cate-
gory of defeating IMSI catchers. The threat of IMSI catchers persists in all the
generations of the mobile networks2 prior to 5G.
We propose solutions to fix the vulnerability in the identification procedure in
different contexts, namely in 3G, LTE, or 5G. Our solution to fix the vulnerability
in LTE and 3G is a generic solution based on pseudonyms that have the format of
IMSI. The solution may be extended to fix the vulnerability in GSM. However,
we do not dive into defeating IMSI catchers in GSM because an attacker can
mount even more severe attacks on a GSM user by taking a man-in-the-middle
position[11] than by simply catching IMSI.3
The 5G network has fixed the vulnerability in the identification procedure
that IMSI catchers exploit. Even though the vulnerability is fixed, a solution to
fix the same vulnerability in 5G is included in this thesis due to the following
reasons. We proposed the solution in 2017 when finding a fix to the vulnerability
was still an open question. Our solution to fix the vulnerability is different from
the one that is standardised. Our solution uses identity-based encryption that
offers other advantages (along with disadvantages) on top of fixing the vulnera-
bility. The additional pros could not outweigh the cons in the first phase of 5G.
Nevertheless, in future, the additional pros could be so useful that our solution
could be re-considered or be useful in works for new releases of standards.
The second vulnerability of interest in this thesis is related to a delegated
authentication system. An authentication system aims at guaranteeing that the
identity of an entity attempting to access protected resources is genuine. For
example, when a traveller arrives at an airport, the immigration control works as
an authentication system towards ensuring that only authorised people can enter
the country. A passport with a photo of the traveller works as the traveller’s
credential. The immigration control uses the passport to verify the traveller’s
identity. A successful verification of a traveller’s identity does not guarantee that
the traveller is allowed to enter the country. Once the identity of the traveller is
confirmed, the immigration control can check the policies to find out whether a
person with the confirmed identity is allowed (or authorised) to enter the country.
2Cellular networks are frequently referred to as mobile networks. In this thesis, we use the
phrases “mobile network” and “cellular network” interchangeably.
3The major weakness in 2G is that the user does not authenticate the network, i.e., the user
has no way to ensure that it is talking with a legitimate network and not with an impostor.
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Similarly, when a user tries to log into a digital service, an authentication
system of the digital service verifies the identity of the user based on some user
credentials. For example, when a user tries to log into Facebook, the user has to
provide the correct password. Another example is the way the cellular networks
verify a user’s identity. When a cellular network user tries to connect to the
network, the identity of the subscriber is authenticated, by the network. The
identity of the subscriber is embedded in the so-called Subscriber Identification
Module (SIM) card.4 Without a correct SIM card, the authentication will fail.
If the authentication succeeds, it does not mean that the user is authorised to
use the service. For example, a pre-paid user may not have enough balance in
his/her phone to make a call. However, in this thesis, we do not discuss any
authorisation mechanisms.
In a delegated authentication system, the digital service itself does not ver-
ify the user’s identity. Instead, the digital service takes help from a third-party
authentication system to verify the user’s identity. The third-party system in-
forms the digital service if the user’s identity is authentic. This arrangement
of delegating the task of verifying the user’s identity is very convenient for the
users and the digital service providers, and therefore, a commonplace in today’s
cyberspace. Users can log into various digital services, for example, in Finland,
the tax office’s website, using the authentication system of the user’s bank. Also,
users utilise Facebook or Google’s authentication systems to log into different
digital services, e.g., a social media of book lovers.
More specifically, the second vulnerability of interest of this thesis is about
user privacy in a new delegated authentication system in 5G, known as Authen-
tication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA). The system is based
on a user’s mobile-phone credentials, namely, the SIM card, where the cellular
network takes the role of verifying the identity of the user. The system enables
a digital service provider, which is not part of the cellular network, to verify the
identity of the digital service’s users with the help of the authentication system
of the cellular network. The system relieves the service provider from maintain-
ing authentication-related data and the user from memorising many passwords
for different digital service providers. The standardisation of AKMA had been
on-going for around two years before it was released in July 2020.
Our results include the requirement analysis of AKMA with a particular focus
on privacy requirements. We propose to put less trust in the cellular network.
4The name “SIM card” became popular from the GSM technology. In newer generation
mobile networks, the corresponding element is called UICC. In less technical texts it is still
called SIM card.
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One of the reasons to put less trust is the rising trend of insider attacks [5–7].
Consequently, we find two new user privacy requirements. The user may use
various kinds of services, such as gambling or dating services. We argue that
the authentication server, i.e., the cellular network, does not need to know which
digital services the user connects to. Also, if two digital service providers collude,
they should not be able to link two of their users. That is, if a person uses a dating
service with the pseudonym romeo and a gambling service with the pseudonym
smeagol then the dating service and the gambling service, even when colluding,
should not be able to figure out that romeo and smeagol are indeed the same
person. In this thesis, we propose a privacy-preserving AKMA, which could be
offered as a premium service to privacy-sensitive users.
The thesis includes four academic papers published in an international journal
and three conferences. The papers are appended at the end of the thesis. We
briefly introduce them in the following.
Paper I This paper is an extension of one of our conference papers [12] into
a journal paper. In this paper, we proposed a solution to mitigate IMSI catch-
ers in 5G using Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) to fix the vulnerability in the
identification procedure. The solution also has the advantage of faster mutual au-
thentication compared to the existing cellular authentication protocols. However,
the standards for the first phase of 5G came out after we published our paper,
and the vulnerability in the identification procedure was fixed using public-key
cryptography. Nevertheless, the advantages of our solution may become more
desirable in the future.
Paper II This paper presents a generic solution to fix the vulnerability in the
identification procedure in LTE and 3G. The solution introduces pseudonyms
that are exchanged between the user and the network piggybacking on the mes-
sages of the existing authentication protocols. Pseudonym-based solutions have
the advantage that they require relatively less patching effort during implemen-
tation in the already deployed LTE or 3G networks. Existing pseudonym-based
solutions had a common vulnerability. We showed that an attacker could exploit
the vulnerability to mount a “distributed denial of service” attack. Our solution
proposed a fix to the vulnerability.
Paper III This paper presents a pseudonym-based solution to fix the vulnera-
bility in the identification procedure in the 3G and LTE networks for 5G users. A
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5G user, when 5G network coverage is not available in a place, may get an offer to
connect to a legacy network, e.g., 3G or LTE, which can be seen as a downgraded
offer. The 5G user would want to accept the downgraded offer because the user
would have to remain disconnected otherwise. Because of this compliance to
downgrading, IMSI catchers remain a threat against 5G users, even if the 5G
network itself is immune to the threat. The solution leverages 5G AKA to get
rid of some downsides of the pseudonym-based solution presented in Paper II.
Paper IV The paper analyses the requirements that AKMA should fulfil. The
requirement analysis includes a comparison of AKMA requirements with the re-
quirements of similar existing systems. Along with the existing long-term identity
privacy requirement, the paper also proposes two new privacy requirements. The
paper presents a solution that fulfils these privacy requirements and most other
requirements too. The solution includes an outline of how the privacy-preserving
AKMA can be combined with a normal mode AKMA so that they can co-exist.




In this chapter, we present a bird’s-eye view of this thesis in the realm of rele-
vant technologies and concepts. Most of the contributions to the thesis lie at the
intersection of cellular technology, identity privacy, and cryptography. Identity
privacy is a sub-concept of privacy; we discuss their differences in Section 2.1.
A small portion of this thesis lies at the intersection of cellular technology, pri-
vacy (not identity privacy), and cryptography. Another small portion lies at the
intersection of cellular technology and cryptography (see Figure 2.1).
In the following, we discuss aspects of these concepts – (identity) privacy,
cellular technology, cryptography – that are relevant for explaining the big picture
sketched above. In this chapter, we do not present details of the specific problems
that we solve; they are presented in Chapter 3.
2.1 Privacy and Identity Privacy
At the turn of every technological leap forward, privacy threats become more
invasive and encompass broader contexts of human society. At the beginning of
the second industrial revolution, which is at the end of 19th century, invasions of
privacy were perceived due to the emergence of instantaneous photography and
widespread circulation of newspapers.1 During the third industrial revolution,
which is in the second half of the 20th century, the advent of contraceptives and
computers sparked a greater concern for the invasion of privacy.2
1The concern is articulated in the influential law review article “The Right to Privacy”
written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis [14].
2In 1965, the Griswold decision [15] against contraception prohibition on the ground of the
right to “marital privacy” gave us a glimpse of how the understanding of privacy had changed
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Figure 2.1: Position of the thesis.
The concern mentioned above has turned into public outcries in the Internet-
shaped modern world (the fourth industrial revolution) [17, 18]. Today’s privacy
threats are invasive to the point of threatening one of the fundamental pillars of
the modern world – democracy.
Though the debate of privacy is old and pervading in our society, an overarch-
ing conceptualisation of privacy is elusive. In 2008, Daniel J. Solove, in his book
“Understanding Privacy” [19] has claimed that privacy as a concept is in disarray.
In favour of his claim, Solove has quoted philosophers, legal theorists, and jurists
who have frequently lamented the great difficulty in reaching a satisfying concep-
tion of privacy. For example, Solove quotes legal theorist Robert Post, “Privacy
is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions,
so engorged with various and distinct meanings that I sometimes despair whether
it can be usefully addressed at all”.
In 1976, Paul Sieghart, in his book Privacy and Computers [20] has discussed
the difficulties that lie around defining the concept of privacy. Sieghart writes
that discussions of privacy revolve around three facets: (i) the condition of privacy
with the advent of new technologies. In 1967, Alan F. Westin, in his book “Privacy and
Freedom” [16], had discussed how the low-cost electronic surveillance devices were threatening
privacy of individuals.
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(ii) the desire for privacy (iii) the right to privacy. According to Sieghart, the
condition of privacy has more or less a common denominator, i.e., seclusion.
However, he explains that the difficulty comes from the subjective nature of the
desire for privacy, the conflict between privacy and other socio-economic values,
and the necessity of defining a firm boundary of privacy as a legal right.
Many theories (e.g., the right to be let alone, limited access to the self, secrecy,
intimacy) have been proposed by the theorists to capture the essence of privacy.
Solove, in his book, has argued that each of the theories is either too broad
or too narrow. He claims, the reason the theories fail lies in the method used
by theorists to conceptualise privacy. Solove proposes a pragmatic method that
suggests treating privacy more contextually.
In this thesis, we do not try to obtain a universal definition of privacy. We
turn our attention to the 3GPP community for a definition of privacy in the
context of cellular networks. This approach is consistent with Solove’s pragmatic
approach. We searched and found just one 3GPP document with an explicit
definition of privacy. This document is the 3GPP Technical Report (TR) 33.899
[21].3
2.1.1 A Working Definition of Privacy in Cellular Networks
In 3GPP TR 33.899 [21], privacy is defined as the right to the protection of
Personally Identifiable Information (PII). In the document, PII is defined as any
information that (a) can be used to identify a subscription to whom such infor-
mation relates, or (b) is or might be directly or indirectly linked to a subscription.
According to 3GPP TR 21.905 [22], a subscription describes the commercial re-
lationship between the subscriber and the service provider.
It is worth discussing the difference between a subscriber and a user. A
subscriber is an entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a
subscription with a service provider. The subscriber is allowed to subscribe and
unsubscribe services, to register a user or a list of users authorised to enjoy these
33GPP TR 33.899 [21] is a collection of proposed security requirements and solutions that
were collected during the study of the 5G architecture. The study phase ended in August 2017,
and the document was withdrawn in September 2017. The reason for withdrawal is perhaps
due to the big effort required to evaluate every proposed requirement and solution rigorously
and make the whole document coherent. Nevertheless, the content of 3GPP TR 33.899 [21]
reflected the state of the work when the study ended. The privacy definition presented in the
TR appears to be reasonable, and we use it as a working definition of privacy of users in the
cellular network.
14 2 Big Picture
services, and also to set the limits relative to the use that associated users make
of these services [22].
So, in summary, a subscriber is an entity that pays, and a user is an entity
that uses the services. These two entities, in most cases, are the same but
may be different. The network authenticates the subscriber’s identity (not the
user’s identity) which is embedded in the user’s device. Therefore, in principle,
the network remains oblivious about the actual user, i.e., the network cannot
tell who (the subscriber or someone else) is using the subscribed services. This
arrangement, i.e., not authenticating the user’s identity, keeps the authentication
infrastructure relatively simple and provides relatively easy usability experiences.
For example, a mother may become the subscriber so that her child can use the
services.
In the legal context of the USA, sometimes, the term PII refers to a smaller
set of information than that in 3GPP vocabulary [23]; information that is not
considered to be PII in North America may be considered to be PII in 3GPP.
In 2007, in the USA, the Executive Office of President - Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), defined PII in a memorandum for safeguarding against and
responding to the breach of PII. Later, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) used the definition in one of their recommendations for pro-
tecting PII [24]. The OMB definition of PII is in the following [25]:
Information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s iden-
tity, such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc.
alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying information
which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place
of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc.
In the OMB definition, the term PII refers to information that is limited to
human. In contrast, the 3GPP definition refers to information related to sub-
scriptions; both an individual and an organisation can have subscriptions. The
OMB definition talks about information that would reveal a long-term (social)
identity of a person. In contrast, it appears, the scope of the 3GPP definition
extends to any information that is linkable even if it does not reveal a long-term
(social) identity of the related person.
In the light of the above discussion, it appears that the 3GPP definition of
PII is more aligned with the European understanding of personal information as
defined as “personal data” in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
The definition of personal data in GDPR includes data about both identified and
identifiable natural persons. The GDPR definition is the following [26]:
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Any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person
(’data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identi-
fied, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as
a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to
one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.
The European understanding of personal information includes a wide range
of data related to an identifiable person. However, the 3GPP definition differs
from the European definition too – 3GPP refers to a subscription, but GDPR
refers to a natural person only. Perhaps the difference stems from 3GPP’s focus
on the subscriber’s identity instead of the user’s identity.
In 3GPP, the definition of PII includes information related to both natural
persons and organisations as long as they are subscribers. Maybe 3GPP does
not want to differentiate between subscribers and natural persons only for the
purpose of the privacy definition. This is indeed not a problem from the privacy
point of view because the scope of personal information in 3GPP’s definition is
wider than in the GDPR definition. However, it is usually more important to
protect the privacy of a natural person than an organisation. For example, a
municipality may subscribe to services which are used by machines like traffic
signal posts; here, neither the municipality nor the signal post’s privacy is much
of a concern.
It is known that an adversary equipped with relevant but crucial partial in-
formation may be able to link non-personal-looking data to an individual [27].
Thus, identifying the adversaries and their capabilities are central towards recog-
nising privacy threats. We follow the seven principles of privacy by design [28]
towards identifying privacy threats. In conjunction with the 3GPP definition
of privacy and the principles of privacy by design, we identify privacy problems
in cellular networks. We put a special focus on the “collection limitation” and
“data minimisation” FIPs (Fair Information Practices) that inform the “privacy
as the default” principle of privacy by design [28]. The “collection limitation”
and “data minimisation” FIPs as defined by Cavoukian [28] are presented below.
Collection Limitation: The collection of personal information must be fair,
lawful and limited to that which is necessary for the specified purposes.
Data Minimisation: The collection of personally identifiable information
should be kept to a strict minimum. The design of programs, information and
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communications technologies, and systems should begin with non-identifiable in-
teractions and transactions, as the default. Wherever possible, identifiability,
observability, and linkability of personal information should be minimised.
Here is a summary of both FIPs. An entity in an electronic communication
system should not know anything about a user that the entity does not need, to
provide the expected functionality.
2.1.2 Identity Privacy
The “identity” of an individual is a broad concept that refers to values of dif-
ferent attributes – e.g., name, address, ethnicity, religion – of the individual.
The term “identity privacy” is used in discussions of user privacy in the con-
text of electronic communication systems [29–36]; and the term “identity” in
“identity privacy” refers to the digital identity, i.e., the identifier that represents
the external agent (usually a natural person) that participates in the electronic
communication system.
Some of the digital identities are used to recognise an individual for a long
duration of time; for example, email addresses, or Facebook ID. Because of their
permanent nature, by learning these long-term identities, an adversary may be
able to track the footprint of the natural person inside the digital system. How-
ever, not all identities are of a long-term nature. Some identities are used only
for a short duration of time. For example, when a person arrives at a service
centre, the individual is assigned a queue number or a case number. The as-
signed number works as a temporary identity for the individual during his time
waiting for the service. In a digital system, a person may be assigned many such
temporary identities.
In several publications [29–36], the authors define (or implicitly assume)
“identity privacy”, in the context of a communication system, as concealing the
digital identities of a sender (or receiver) of a message from anyone else but the
intended receiver (or sender) of the message. Therefore, the concept of identity
privacy is equivalent to the concept of identity confidentiality.
Usually, the temporary identities are not meant to be linkable with a long-
term identity of the person, hence they do not threaten the privacy of the person.
However, if not designed carefully, temporary identities may become linkable and
be used to identify the associated natural person participating in the system [37].
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Please note that the privacy of an individual may be breached due to the
undesired exposure of other information (apart from digital identities) about the
participating natural person. We discuss such privacy breaches in the following.
2.1.3 Privacy Issues Due to Exposure of Non-identity Data
The privacy of an individual can be breached without an attacker knowing the
true identity of the individual, i.e., without knowing the specific natural person
involved. For example, an advertising agency can track a user, e.g., by using
third-party cookies or browser fingerprinting, without learning the true identity
of the user, and be able to send targeted-marketing content. Though the true
identity may remain unknown to the agency, being a victim of such a marketing
target is considered to be a breach of privacy. Reasons behind such perception
include the risk of receiving a tailored price of the advertised product, and the
perceived intrusiveness of the advertising [38].
The privacy of an individual can also be breached by compiling an anonymised
dataset with a de-anonymised dataset. For example, an adversary can breach an
individual’s financial privacy by analysing anonymised credit-card data, which
include date and place of spendings for each card, in conjunction with the knowl-
edge of the individual’s travel destinations extracted from his twitter posts [27].
The financial privacy breach, in this case, is possible due to the attacker know-
ing both the victim’s travel destinations and the credit-card data that includes,
among other things, the victim’s data.
2.2 Cellular Networks
In this section, we give a short description of the evolution of cellular networks.
We briefly explain the working procedures of the 3GPP community and present
an overview of the architecture of cellular networks. Finally, we discuss user
identities in cellular networks.
2.2.1 A Brief History of Cellular Networks
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, all around the world, many automated, and
large-scale mobile-network standards emerged [39, p. 250-251]. For example,
Bell Labs in the USA developed the Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS)
in 1979. Japan’s Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) company developed
mobile-network standards in 1979. The Nordic countries developed the Nordic
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Mobile Telephony (NMT) system in 1981. These were the first generation, 1G
networks, and all of them were based on the analogue radio signal. Throughout
the 1980s, operators in many countries of the world deployed these networks.
Some of these standards became commercially successful [40, p. 24-30].
Following the success of 1G networks, the European Conference of Postal
and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) conceived the need for a com-
mon mobile-network standard. The European Commission showed interest in
CEPT’s desire for the common standard [41]. Within CEPT, a new group called
Groupe Special Mobile (GSM) [42] was created with the specific task to create
the common standard [43, Section 1.3]. In 1987, the GSM group delivered the
first standard of the GSM network [44]. In 1988, CEPT transferred the GSM
group (and all the standards) to the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) [42], which was also created by CEPT in the same year. Finnish
operator OY Radiolinja was the first to commercially deploy the GSM network
[45, p. 529]. Since then, GSM networks have been deployed in many countries and
became the most successful in the history of telecommunication. However, other
second-generation network standards also exist; e.g., CDMA-One and D-AMPS
from the USA, and PDS from Japan [40].
The data rate provided by the GSM networks was not fast enough for many
multimedia mobile applications [46, p. 440]. Also, the idea to ensure fully global
roaming (users to use the mobile system services anywhere in the world) was
pushing for another technological leap forward. Standards bodies from Europe,
Asia, and North America established a collaborative project known as the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) in 1998, under the scope of the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union (ITU). This new collaborative project devel-
oped the first truly global cellular technologies (3GPP Release-1999) based on the
GSM standards [47]. The new third generation, 3G technology, is also known as
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS). Other third-generation
standards also emerged; e.g., CDMA2000 in the USA [48]. However, in the rest
of this thesis, we use the terms UMTS and 3G interchangeably.
Since its inception, 3GPP has managed the evolution and maintenance of the
GSM and 3G standards. The first version of specifications for the 3GPP-defined
fourth generation, 4G network (3GPP Release-8) was released in 2008. This 4G
network is also known as Long-Term Evolution (LTE) or Evolved Packet System
(EPS). In the rest of this thesis, we use the terms LTE and EPS interchangeably.
The first version of specifications for the 3GPP-defined fifth generation, 5G net-
work (3GPP Release-15) was released in 2018. This 5G network is also known
as the Next Generation Mobile Network (NGMN).
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One major improvement from one generation to the next has always been a
significantly higher data rate. The maximum downlink data rate in GSM Release-
96 was 14.4 kbit/s [49], which improved to 42 Mbit/s in 3G [50]. In LTE, the
maximum downlink data rate reached 300 Mbit/s [51], which is improved to more
than 1 Gbps in 5G [52].
2.2.2 Working Procedures of 3GPP
In 3GPP, a specification work follows a three-stage model. Stage 1 specifications
define the requirements of new services. Stage 2 specifications contain architec-
tural descriptions, e.g., what the functional entities are and what information
flows between them, that meet the requirements. Finally, Stage 3 specifications
include bit-level descriptions of protocols that realise the architecture.
The entire specification work is divided between different Technical Specifi-
cation Groups (TSG). Each TSG consists of multiple working groups. Typically
different working groups carry out different stages for the same features. For
example, one working group of the TSG Service and System Aspects (TSG-SA),
which is known as SA WG1, concentrates purely on requirements, i.e., Stage 1
specifications. Another working group of the same TSG, which is known as SA
WG2, creates system architecture, i.e., Stage 2 specifications. An example of a
working group that specifies Stage 3 specifications would be Working Group 1
of the TSG Core Network and Terminals (CT), which is known as CT WG1.
The security features are specified in a working group known as SA WG3 (or
SA3 for short) under TSG-SA. The working group SA3 mostly produces Stage 2
specifications. However, it also produces some Stage 3 specifications, such as the
bit level descriptions of cryptographic algorithms.
We mentioned in Subsection 2.2.1 that 3GPP is a collaborative project. Spec-
ification work on a feature can go forward only if some of the participant members
are interested in investing necessary resources. As a general rule, the relevant
TSG has to approve a work item before a working group can start working on
the specification of a feature. The working group often opens a study document
known as a Technical Report (TR). The participants contribute to the TR doc-
ument towards analysing the feasibility of the feature and selecting an optimal
solution. The insights gained from a TR document usually used in writing the
Technical Specification (TS) document.
The TR documents are informative, for example, they inform about the rel-
evant state-of-the-art prior to writing the related technical specifications, and
therefore, also inform the rationale of the technical specifications. Therefore,
20 2 Big Picture
TR documents assist an interested person with regard to a particular subject
area. An implementer can completely ignore the TR documents and still build
equipment compliant with 3GPP specifications. Some TR documents may have
a ”withdrawn” status because of, e.g., incomplete studies.
The TS documents have normative status, i.e., the specifications mentioned
in these documents are necessary for the application of the standard in which
they are mentioned. If an implementer ignores some specifications mentioned in
a TS document, then the implementer may end up building equipment that is
incompatible with equipment built by other implementers. Forsberg et al. [47,
p. 22] present a discussion of the working procedure in 3GPP.
2.2.3 A Simplified View of Cellular Network Architecture
Cellular networks have complex architectures. Moreover, across the generations,
the architecture has changed many times. To be able to discuss the problems
in cellular network security and privacy that are relevant in this thesis, it is
convenient and possible to keep most of the intricate parts of the architecture
out of focus. By doing so, we can get rid of most of the jargon, obtain a birds-eye
view, and gain more leverage to concentrate on the real essence of the problems.
However, as a consequence of such a simplification, this architecture would not
shed much light on other aspects of mobile networks, e.g., how the user makes a
voice call to another user or uses Internet services.
A mobile network consists of three parts (see Figure 2.2): (i) User Equipment
(UE) – a user usually carries this device as the user moves, (ii) Serving Network
(SN) – that the UE connects to, and (iii) Home Network (HN) – the user has a
subscription with this network. Both the SN and HN are connected to the public
Internet. A UE comprises a Mobile Equipment (ME) with a radio interface and
a tamper-resistant smart card known as UICC.4 The ME has a slot to insert the
UICC inside it. The UICC hosts a Universal Subscriber Identification Module
(USIM).5
A UE runs many protocols with the SN to provide services to its user. For
example, once turned on, the UE scans and finds a suitable radio interface to
camp on; then the UE runs an authentication protocol to authenticate itself to
4According to ETSI TR 102 216 [53], a UICC is a smart card that conforms to the specifi-
cations written and maintained by the ETSI Smart Card Platform project. The TR document
also states that UICC is neither an abbreviation nor an acronym.
5In GSM network, the card is limited to the functions of a Subscriber Identification Module
(SIM). Therefore, the card itself is known as the SIM card. However, in the newer generations,
the UICC may run other functionalities than a USIM.










Figure 2.2: Cellular Network.
the SN. Another example is the paging procedure – when there is incoming traffic
to a UE, the SN broadcasts paging messages to a bunch of UEs in order to find
the right receiver. Most of these protocols are transparent to the user, i.e., they
are silently run between the UE and the SN without the user noticing anything.
Furthermore, both the SN and HN themselves have two parts: (a) a radio
network that covers a large geographical area and (b) a core network that the
radio network connects to, is centred in a small area like a data centre, and can
itself connect to another core network or the Internet. When the user is roaming,
the core network of the SN connects to the core network of the HN. However,
when the user is not roaming, the SN and the HN are the same networks; hence,
we do not show the radio network part of the HN in the picture.
The UICC contains a permanent identity of the user. This permanent identity
is known as IMSI in GSM, 3G, and LTE, and as SUPI in 5G. The UICC includes
a symmetric cryptographic key that is also known only by the HN and no one else.
In GSM, 3G, LTE, and 5G specifications, this key is referred to as “Individual
Subscriber Authentication Key”, “authentication key”, “permanent key” and
“long-term key” respectively. In this thesis, we call it the permanent key. The
key is used only in the authentication server and the USIM. Both of these entities
are configured by the same authority, i.e., the HN. Therefore, the length of the
permanent key does not need to be standardised. However, 3GPP specifications
provide example use of these keys which require them to be only 128 bits long.
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The 3GPP specifications also provide example use of these keys which require
them to be either 128 or 256 bits long [54, Clause 6.3.7].
Using an API of the USIM, an ME can read the IMSI. The UICC is tamper-
resistant; therefore, reading the content of the UICC using other means than
using a USIM API is not feasible. However, there is no API to read the per-
manent key. Nevertheless, the USIM has APIs that the ME can use to compute
different functions based on the permanent key. The security of most of the cryp-
tographic techniques used in mobile networks (in all the generations) depends on
the randomness and secrecy of this pre-shared permanent key.
In 5G, the HN has a public-private key pair which is used during the identifi-
cation phase of a user. The public key of the HN is provisioned in a 5G-enabled
UICC.
2.2.4 User Identities in Cellular Networks
A mobile user has various identities. Some identities are more volatile than
others. Some identities are assigned and maintained by the SN, and some by the
HN. Some identities are permanently embedded in the ME by the manufacturer;
hence, they can be associated with different users if multiple users reuse the ME.
This thesis does not focus on the privacy of all of these identities. In this section,
we shed light on some of these identities that are relevant in this thesis.
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is a long-term identity of a
mobile user that is embedded in the user’s UICC. An IMSI is usually presented as
a 15 decimal-digit number but can be shorter. The first three digits are the Mobile
Country Code (MCC), which are followed by the Mobile Network Code (MNC),
either two or three digits. The length of the MNC depends on the length of the
MCC. The remaining digits are the Mobile Subscription Identification Number
(MSIN) within the network’s customer base [55]. In GSM, 3G, and LTE, a mobile
user may use IMSI to identify itself to the network.
The 5G users have a globally unique Subscription Permanent Identifier
(SUPI). A SUPI may contain an IMSI or other identifiers as defined in Clause
5.9.2 in 3GPP TS 23.501 [56]. The Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) is
a privacy-preserving identifier containing the concealed SUPI. The construction
of SUCI is specified in 3GPP TS 33.501 [57]. The structure of SUPI and SUCI
is specified in 3GPP TS 23.003 [55]. In 5G, the user sends SUCI to the network
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to connect, and never sends its SUPI unless connecting in an emergency mode
[57, p. 96].6
A mobile user also has an identity called Mobile Station International Sub-
scriber Directory Number (MSISDN), usually known as a mobile phone number.
The MSISDN is used for routing calls. To make a phone call, a caller uses the
receiver’s MSISDN in dialling up the receiver.
International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) is a unique identity perma-
nently assigned to mobile phones by their manufactures. The ME sends the IMEI
so that the network can know the ME’s expected behaviour. When the UE has
no IMSI or valid GUTI, during emergency attach, the UE sends the IMEI to the
network to identify itself [58, p. 18]. Sometimes the IMEI is accompanied by a
Software Version Number (SV) in which case the identity is called International
Mobile Equipment Identity and Software Version Number (IMEISV). The IMEI
is used as a key identifier for blocking stolen MEs and also as a possible target
identity of LI [21, 59]. Therefore, the UE usually sends the IMEI of the ME to
the network.
Once a mobile user connects to an SN and establishes a security context7, the
SN assigns a temporary identity to the user over the radio network. The message
that carries the temporary identity is confidentiality protected. This identity is
known as Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI)8 in GSM, and 3G. In
LTE and 5G, the corresponding identity is called Globally Unique Temporary
UE Identity (GUTI) and 5G-GUTI respectively [55]. In the case of roaming,
the HN does not know a user’s TMSI,GUTI, or 5G-GUTI. The SN also assigns
temporary identities, e.g., C-RNTI (Cell Radio Network Temporary Identifier)
to manage radio resources assigned to the user.
At the application layer, a mobile user may be identified by different identities
by different application service providers. In this thesis, we refer to these iden-
tities with the term Service-specific Permanent User Identity (SPUID). These
user identities are not concerned with the cellular networks, and the SN or HN
do not need to know any SPUID of a user. Also, a user has identities that appear
publicly in the domain of particular services. We refer to these domain-specific
public identities with the term “screen-name”.
6It is worth mentioning here that in 5G, the SN never sends SUPI over the air to the UE in
any form of communication procedures or protocols.
7A security context refers to the set of security parameters, such as cryptographic keys and
algorithm identifiers that are used to protect the data/signal exchanged between the UE and
the SN [47, p. 129].
8A user may be assigned multiple TMSIs [55].











Figure 2.3: User Identities in Cellular Network.
In this thesis, we use a new temporary identity known as a pseudonym
in a similar way as proposed in several publications [4, 60–62]. Pseudonyms
have the same format as IMSI. Unlike other temporary identities
(TMSI,GUTI, 5G-GUTI), these pseudonyms are assigned by the HN9.
Figure 2.3 shows different identities of cellular network users along with their
scope; some identities, e.g., C-RNTI, TMSI, are local only to the SN, and some
other identities, e.g., IMSI, reach up to the HN. A UICC can host one or more
USIMs [63, 64], and every USIM has a unique IMSI/SUPI. In most cases, one
IMSI/SUPI is associated with one MSISDN. An IMEI can be associated with
multiple IMSIs/SUPIs and MSISDNs, for example, when the ME has a UICC
that hosts multiple USIMs or has multiple UICCs, e.g., in a dual-SIM phone [65].
Let us take some concrete examples. If a user changes to a new phone but
keeps using the same UICC, then the IMEI and temporary identities such as C-
RNTI or TMSI change, but the other identities such as IMSI, SUPI, or MSISDN
remain the same. If a user removes a UICC from the ME and inserts a new UICC,
then the IMSI, MSISDN, and associated temporary identities such as C-RNTI
or TMSI change, but the IMEI remains the same. A user may lose a current
9The SN assigns TMSI,GUTI, and 5G-GUTI; the HN does not know them.
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UICC, or the current UICC may become incompatible with the new phone, and
he/she will get a new UICC from his mobile operator while keeping the associated
MSISDN unchanged. A user’s SPUIDs are independent of the UICC and phone,
i.e., the SPUIDs of a user remain the same no matter which UICC and phone
the user uses. Conversely, a user could lend his phone to somebody else in order
to check Facebook. In such a case, the SPUID related to Facebook changes, but
everything else remains the same.
2.2.5 Delegated Authentication in Cellular Networks
Through a delegated authentication system, a third-party application can au-
thenticate its users and establish secret keys with the help of an authentication
server. Such a system is useful for both users and third-party applications. Users
can get rid of memorising many application-specific credentials. Third parties
can get rid of maintaining authentication-related data.
Two delegated authentication systems exist in the previous generations of
cellular networks. One is the Generic Bootstrap Architecture (GBA) [66, 67]
and the other is Battery Efficient Security for Very Low Throughput Machine
Type Communication Devices (BEST) [68]. In both of them, the user’s HN takes
the role of the authentication server. A new study on a 5G-suitable delegated
authentication system known as AKMA (Authentication and Key Management
for Applications) [69] is in the standardisation phase at the time of writing this.
2.3 Identity Privacy in Cellular Networks
In light of the discussion about privacy and identity privacy in Section 2.1, the
long-term identities, e.g., IMSI, SUPI, MSISDN, IMEI, IMEISV, should be pro-
tected from third parties. Indeed, these identities should be required only by the
SN/HN to provide network services to the user. For Lawful Interception (LI)
purposes, the SN needs to know permanent identities, e.g., IMSI. For routing
purposes, the SN/HN needs to know the MSISDN of the dialled number.10
Towards ensuring identity privacy in cellular networks, it is crucial to ensure
that while sending the identities mentioned above to the network, a third party
(an active/passive attacker) does not get access to them. Malicious third parties
known as IMSI catchers are well-known threats against the identity privacy of
10The UE never sends/receives its own MSISDN to/from the network [70].
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mobile users. An IMSI catcher tricks user devices to reveal IMSIs, and can track
and monitor the location of a user [60].
A major portion of this thesis discusses mitigating IMSI catchers. An IMSI
catcher may track/monitor a user by exploiting vulnerabilities in different pro-
tocols that the UE runs. In this thesis, we focus on the most easily exploitable
vulnerability that IMSI catchers exploit. The vulnerability is due to the way the
UE identifies itself to the network, explained in Chapter 3. Other vulnerabilities
exist in the way paging messages are broadcast by the network or authentication
reject messages are sent by the UE [71]. Due to vulnerabilities in paging and au-
thentication reject messages, an attacker may track/monitor a known target by
simply sending the target an SMS or an instant message in any instant messaging
app [72].
The other identities mentioned in Subsection 2.2.4 are either concealed or
short-lived. The short-lived identities do not usually pose threats to the identity
privacy of mobile users. However, if those identities are not changed at the
suggested intervals, privacy might be compromised [72]. Also, the temporary
identities such as GUTIs, need to be unlinkable, i.e., two GUTIs assigned to the
same UE should not be linkable. If the temporary identity assignment procedure
is not designed carefully, the temporary identities might become linkable with
each other, as shown in the 3G network [37].
A user may have many other identities at different layers of the protocol
stack. For example, a user has many identities at the application layer to use
various applications. Also, a user is usually assigned cookies by many web service
providers. An advertisement agency may drop third-party cookies when a user
loads a web page that comes with an advertisement of the advertisement agency.
The third-party cookies give great leverage to the advertisement agencies to do
targeted marketing; therefore breach the privacy of the users [73, 74]. A user’s
device also has permanent and unique identities for different radio interfaces such
as Bluetooth or WiFi. A user’s device has IP address(es), which sometimes can
be used for a long period of time. Identity privacy may be compromised due to an
attacker exploiting undesired exposures of the aforementioned identities, possibly
by linking with other personal data [75–77]. However, usernames, cookies, IP
addresses are artefacts that are not specified by the cellular network protocols.
In this thesis, we primarily focus on identity privacy threats due to undesired
exposures of digital identities that are exchanged during the run of cellular net-
work protocols. Moreover, we do not try to fix vulnerabilities related to all the
cellular-network identities. This is because trying to fix every vulnerability would
be too big a task to handle in a single work. We prioritise the vulnerabilities
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based on how easily and effectively an adversary can exploit a vulnerability. One
vulnerability related to IMSI is the most easily and effectively exploitable by an
adversary; the vulnerability is explained in Subsection 3.2.1. Most of our effort is
invested in fixing this vulnerability. Please note that identity privacy in cellular
networks can be compromised due to other reasons, e.g., unauthorised access to
the servers of the network [78].
2.4 AKMA-related Problems
Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) is a delegated
authentication system [69] that is under standardisation in the 3GPP commu-
nity at the time of writing this. In the evolved ecosystem of 5G, use cases of
AKMA vary from that of similar systems, e.g., GBA. In this thesis, we present
a requirement analysis of AKMA.
The AKMA requirements include privacy requirements too. Some of the
privacy requirements lie in the domain of identity privacy, and some do not. We
discuss the AKMA-related privacy problems in Chapter 3.
2.5 Lawful Interception in Cellular Networks
Lawful Interception (LI) involves selectively intercepting communications of in-
dividual subscribers by legally authorised agencies. Lawful interception require-
ments vary from one jurisdiction to the other. A user, when roaming, is legally
accountable to the jurisdiction of the country where the user is travelling. The
cellular networks are designed so that they can fulfil the LI requirements of the
country where the networks are operating.
For example, the authorised agency typically provides the long-term identifier
of a target UE to the network operator, which must have the means to intercept
communications of the correct target based on long-term or permanent identifiers
associated with that target. The requirement also says that a network operator
should be able to intercept without the need to rely on another network operator
or jurisdiction. In particular, an SN does not need to share LI target identities
of roaming UE with an HN and vice versa [79, 80].
The additional constraints of LI make the design of privacy-preserving pro-
tocols challenging in some cases. In Paper I, Paper II, and Paper III, we have
discussed one of the LI requirements and how the requirement has created com-
plications in designing solutions defeating IMSI catchers.
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2.6 Cryptographic Techniques
All the solutions presented in this thesis are based on cryptographic techniques.
Moreover, the solutions related to AKMA are all about establishing keys that
would be used mostly for cryptographic purposes.
We use well-known cryptographic constructs towards solving privacy prob-
lems. Our solutions depend on the cellular network authentication protocols
known as Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA): UMTS AKA [54], LTE
AKA [58], and 5G AKA [57].
The AKA protocols are symmetric-key-based authentication protocols that
include cryptographic operations such as encryption, message authentication,
hashing, key derivation, and more. In 5G, the user identification protocol uses
public-key-based cryptography [57] without a need for Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). Both the symmetric-key and public-key cryptography depend on a secure
random number generator.
Details of all of these cryptographic constructs can be found in many stan-
dard cryptographic textbooks. For example, Douglas R. Stinson’s book “Cryp-
tography: Theory and Practice” [81] is a good read. A complexity-theory-based
treatment of the security of these constructs can be found in the two parts of
Oded Goldreich’s book “Foundations of Cryptography” [82].
Our solutions also utilise the aforementioned cryptographic constructs on
top of the AKA protocols. In addition, in Paper I, we use the Identity-Based
Encryption (IBE) [81, 83–85]. In the solution, we also use digital signatures that
may require a PKI. The privacy-related claims of the solution depend on the
hardness of the Delayed-Target Diffie-Hellman Problem (DTDHP) [13].
Chapter 3
Research Problems
The thesis looks into privacy (mostly identity privacy) problems of users in cellu-
lar networks. In a communication system, generally, most identity privacy issues
stem from the system’s user authentication requirements. Had the system not re-
quired user authentication, the user would not need to identify himself; therefore,
many privacy problems would disappear.
3.1 Background on Authentication
The users pay for the mobile network services they use. Therefore, it is unavoid-
able to authenticate a user so that the user can be billed correctly. To study the
privacy problems of mobile users, it is essential to first look into the authentica-
tion mechanisms of mobile networks. Every generation of mobile networks has
their versions of Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocols: (i) GSM
AKA, (ii) UMTS AKA, (iii) EPS AKA, and (iv) 5G AKA.
Before we present the problems that this thesis solves, we present the basic
principles of these authentication protocols. The basic principles would be useful
to understand the problems. We use greater details of these protocols in our
solutions. Hence, in order to discuss the solutions, we need to recall details of
the AKAs. In Chapter 4, the UMTS, EPS and 5G AKA are presented in greater
detail so that solutions presented in the successive chapters can be read with
fewer cross-checks in the literature.
The basic principles of all these authentication protocols are the same. They
all hinge on a pre-shared permanent key that only the UE and the HN know. All
the AKA protocols can be characterised by having two phases: (i) identification
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Figure 3.1: User Identification (GSM, 3G, LTE).
and (ii) authentication. In the following, we explain the two phases and then
also briefly explain what happens after a successful run of an AKA protocol.
3.1.1 Identification
In the identification phase, the UE sends the user identity to the SN. The UE
may use a temporary identity – e.g., TMSI or GUTI – that the SN assigned to
the UE. The UE uses its IMSI, for example, when connecting for the first time
with the SN or when the UE has lost the TMSI or GUTI. In case the UE sent a
temporary identity, and the SN could not recognise the temporary identity, the
SN may send an identity request to the user.
Once the UE receives the identity request, it responds to the request by
sending the IMSI in cleartext to the SN (see Figure 3.1). This mechanism is
the same in GSM, 3G and LTE [54, 58, 86, 87], and represents a breach of user
identity privacy. The reason for sending IMSI in cleartext is the absence of a
security context before the identification. Every UE has a different symmetric
key pre-shared with the HN. If the IMSI could be encrypted, then the HN would
not know what key to use to decrypt the IMSI.
If a 5G SN sends an identity request to a 5G user, in the response, the UE
includes a SUCI instead of the SUPI. The SN forwards the SUCI that was sent
by the UE to the HN. Later, the HN sends the SUPI of the user to the SN (see
Figure 3.2). The SUCI is constructed using the public key of the user’s HN [57].
If the subsequent authentication becomes successful and a security context
established between the UE and SN, then the SN assigns a temporary identity
(TMSI,GUTI, or 5G-GUTI) to the UE. The message that carries the tempo-
rary identity from the SN to the UE is confidentiality protected. In the next
identification, the UE may use the temporary identity instead of IMSI or SUCI.








Figure 3.2: User Identification (5G).
3.1.2 Authentication
In the authentication phase, the HN finds the permanent key K of the user (see
Figure 3.3). The HN chooses a random challenge RAND to be solved in the UICC
inside the user’s device. Then the HN computes a message authentication code
MAC of the random challenge RAND using an one-way function f1 that takes
the RAND and K as inputs.1 Then, the HN computes the expected response
XRES to the challenge RAND based on the permanent key K using the one-way
function f2. The HN also computes a session key KS based on the RAND and
K using a one-way function h.2 The HN forwards the random challenge RAND,
its solution XRES, and MAC to the SN. The SN forwards the RAND and MAC
to the user.3
The UE knows the required permanent key K. It computes the solution RES
of the challenge RAND using the one-way function f2 in the same way the HN
computed the XRES. The UE also verifies the message authentication code by
computing the MAC using the function f1 in a similar way as the HN computed
and comparing it with the MAC sent by the SN. If the verification of the MAC
is successful, the UE considers that the involved HN is authentic and the HN
has authorised the SN. The UE forwards the solution RES to the SN. The UE
also computes a session key KS based on the permanent key and the random
1In 3G, LTE, and 5G, the function f1 also takes some other inputs which we do not mention
here in the discussion of the basic principle of the authentication mechanism.
2The session key KS, and one-way function h are just placeholders for the sake of the dis-
cussion in this section. In 3G, there are two such session keys called CK and IK, which are
computed using one-way functions f3 and f4 respectively. In LTE and 5G, the session keys
are called KASME, and KAUSF respectively, which are computed using a key derivation function
that takes more inputs than functions h, f3, or f4.
3In 3G, LTE, and 5G, the MAC is accompanied with some other parameters.
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Figure 3.3: Principle of Authentication in Mobile Networks.
challenge using the one-way function h3. The SN compares XRES and RES. If
they are equal, the SN considers the UE to be authentic.
The idea is that one must know the permanent key K of the user to solve
the challenge, compute the MAC, or KS. Since only the UE and HN know
the permanent key K, the authentication would be successful if and only if the
legitimate UE and correct networks participate.
The description above is the basic principle involved in every AKA except in
GSM. One example of how GSM AKA is different is that no MAC is involved in
GSM AKA. All the parameters related to AKAs are not discussed in this section.
For example, SQN, the sequence number parameter which is used in UMTS, LTE,
and 5G AKA to defeat replay attacks, is not discussed in this section. In Chapter
4, we give a more elaborate presentation of UMTS, LTE and 5G AKA.
3.1.3 Security after a Successful AKA Run
Following the AKA, the UE and the SN run additional procedures (known as
security mode command procedures) to establish a security context and start
cryptographic data protection. The UE and the SN may not use the session key
directly to protect data. In LTE and 5G, during the security mode command
procedure, the SN and UE generate more keys for different kinds of protections of
3.2 Our Research Problems 33
different kinds of data. After the activation of confidentiality protection, the SN
may send a temporary identity (TMSI,GUTI, 5G-GUTI) to the UE. Please see
3GPP TS 33.102 [54, Clause 6.1.2], TS 33.401 [58, Clause 7.1], and TS 33.501[57,
Clause 6.12.3] for details.
In this thesis, the solutions to the privacy problems do not propose changes in
the existing post-AKA security mechanisms. Consequently, existing post-AKA
security procedures are not very relevant in this thesis. Therefore, we limit our
discussion only up to the end of the AKA protocols.
3.2 Our Research Problems
This thesis looks into two problems. The first problem is related to defeating
IMSI catchers. An IMSI catcher can exploit various vulnerabilities. In Subsection
3.2.1, we present a summary of these vulnerabilities. However, we do not try to
fix all those vulnerabilities. Instead, we try to fix the most easily exploitable
vulnerability. The second problem is related to developing AKMA standards.
The research problem includes analysing requirements that AKMA should fulfil.
We put a particular focus on identifying (potentially new) privacy requirements.
The research problem also includes developing a solution mechanism that fulfils
the identified requirements. In Subsection 3.2.2, we present a brief overview of
AKMA-related research problems.
3.2.1 IMSI Catchers
When turned on, a UE scans for legitimate SNs and selects one SN to connect.
The process is called PLMN (Public Land Mobile Network) selection process
[88]. Once a PLMN is selected, the UE selects a suitable radio interface, also
called a cell, and camp on it. The process is known as cell selection process [88].
The UE may switch from a radio interface, on which it is currently camped, to a
newly discovered and more suitable radio interface. The process is known as cell
re-selection process [88]. Different types of measurements are used in different
radio access technologies and modes for cell selection and re-selection [88]. The
performance requirements for the measurements are specified in 3GPP TS 25.123
[89] and TS 25.133 [90].
The primary purpose of cell re-selection is to ensure that the UE camps on
or connects to the best radio interface (cell) in terms of the quality of radio
condition [91]. This tendency of switching to a more suitable radio interface is
perhaps motivated by the goal of achieving an uninterrupted radio connection,
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especially when the user is moving. When a UE is moving, the appearance of a
more suitable radio interface implies that the current radio interface, on which
the UE is currently camped, may become unavailable soon.
An IMSI catcher is a rogue device with a radio interface; it impersonates a
legitimate SN and presents a very tempting radio connection to its near neigh-
bourhood. Consequently, the nearby UEs camp on the rogue device and start
listening to its broadcast channel. At this point, the rogue device can run var-
ious 3GPP-defined procedures with the UE and try to exploit vulnerabilities in
those procedures. The most easily exploitable vulnerability that the rogue device
exploits is in the identification procedure, which is explained in the following.
The rogue device sends an identity request to all the UEs that are listening.
The security architecture of cellular networks is designed in a way that it does not
facilitate a mechanism that could be used at this stage by the UEs to distinguish
a rogue device from a legitimate network. The security architectures, except
in 5G, also do not facilitate a mechanism to send an encrypted IMSI to the
(potentially) rouge device. Currently, the procedure specifies only one possible
response to the identity request, i.e., sending the IMSI in plaintext (encrypted
in 5G). Consequently, according to the protocol, all the UEs that received the
identity request respond by giving their IMSIs in plaintext (encrypted only in
5G) to the rogue device, thus the name “IMSI catcher”. Please see a pictorial
depiction of the attack in Figure 3.4. By observing the presence and absence
of an IMSI at a location, and using some other auxiliary information about the
IMSI, the IMSI catcher can infer the presence of a user in nearby places.4
To breach the location privacy of a user, an IMSI catcher may exploit other
vulnerabilities too. For example, an IMSI catcher can exploit the fact that the
authentication reject messages (sent by the UE to the SN) are sent in plaintext
and be able to monitor the presence/absence of a specific target user; the attack
is explained by Arapinis et al. [71]. Also, vulnerabilities in other procedures, e.g.,
the paging and GUTI allocation procedures, can be exploited by an IMSI catcher
in order to breach the identity privacy of a user. Exploiting these vulnerabilities
usually enables the IMSI catchers to link different temporary identities, or link
between a known long-term identity and a temporary identity of the victim. Khan
and Martin have summarised a list of these vulnerabilities and the associated
attacks in their survey paper on subscription privacy in 5G [92].
4More sophisticated attacks start with IMSI catching, and those attackers are also sometimes
called IMSI catchers [60]. However, in this thesis, we will use the name “IMSI catchers” only
to refer to their ability to breach the identity privacy of mobile users.
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Figure 3.4: IMSI catching in GSM, 3G, and LTE.
The vulnerability in the identification procedure is the most easily exploitable
because, among other reasons, the IMSI catcher does not need to know any
long-term identity of a victim before mounting the attack. Therefore, the attack
can be mounted simultaneously against all the nearby users that find the IMSI
catcher’s radio signal suitable. Other vulnerabilities cannot be exploited in such
a simultaneous fashion because the IMSI catcher would have to target a partic-
ular victim and analyse the information sniffed in from the radio channel before
arriving at any conclusion about the victim’s presence or absence at the location.
This thesis focuses on fixing the vulnerability in the identification procedure
to defend against IMSI catchers, and it keeps the other vulnerabilities out of its
scope. We look for fixes to the vulnerability from three angles:
1. in the 5G network,
2. in legacy networks (3G and LTE), and
3. when a 5G user tries to connect to a 3G or LTE network.
The vulnerability in the identification procedure has been fixed in 5G by using
public-key cryptography. So, it is worth explaining why this thesis includes a
solution to fix a vulnerability in 5G that has already been solved in 5G.
During the early phase (in 2016 and 2017) of our research, 5G was undergoing
the process of standardisation, and a solution to fix the vulnerability in 5G was
an open question. Therefore, we contributed to the literature by presenting a
potential solution based on the LTE authentication and key agreement protocol
and identity-based encryption. Besides, our solution has other benefits on top of
fixing the vulnerability. Due to the other benefits, it might be considered to be a
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preferred solution in some use cases, for example, in a smart factory or be useful
in future releases of standards.
Fixing the vulnerability in the identification procedure of the legacy networks
is challenging. This challenge is due to the existing widespread installation of
those networks across the world.
3.2.2 Privacy-preserving AKMA
The new delegated authentication system named AKMA has been released in the
second phase of 5G in July 2020. It supports authentication and key manage-
ment for applications and 3GPP services, including the IoT use cases based on
3GPP credentials in the 5G system [69, 93]. In AKMA, the application provider
delegates the authentication of its user to the Home Network (HN) of that user.
Our research problem includes an investigation towards finding requirements
that AKMA should fulfil. Our investigation is mostly based on a comparative re-
quirement analysis of AKMA, GBA, and BEST; we compared what requirements
were fulfilled by GBA and BEST, with what requirements AKMA is envisioned
to fulfil. We have identified some requirements that were fulfilled by GBA/BEST
but not yet considered to be requirements of AKMA. Our requirement analysis
puts a particular focus on finding (potentially new) privacy requirements. We
have identified two privacy requirements in AKMA: (i) privacy of usage – the
identity provider (i.e., the HN) should not know what application providers a
user is using, and (ii) identity unlinkability – two network application providers,
by colluding, should not be able to link two of their users. The research problem




In this thesis, our solutions to the privacy problems leverage messages of UMTS,
EPS and 5G AKA protocols. So, we present details of these protocols that are
needed to understand our solutions. We do not describe parts of these protocols
that are not important to understand our solutions. For example, we skip the
error/failure messages that are sent by the UE or the network when something
does not happen as expected.
4.1 UMTS and EPS AKA
The UMTS and EPS AKA1 are defined in 3GPP TS 33.102 [54] and 33.401 [58],
respectively. The EPS AKA is built on top of the UMTS AKA and reuses many
cryptographic building blocks of the UMTS AKA. In addition, the EPS AKA
has some new functionality and uses new cryptographic building blocks on top of
those in UMTS AKA. The TS 33.401 does not include a stand-alone description
of EPS AKA. It gives only the changes over UMTS AKA.
In this section, we give a high-level description of both UMTS and EPS AKA
together. We explicitly mention their similarities and differences when necessary.
We point out the relevant building blocks and refer to documents that define
those building blocks. We have shown both the identification and authentication
phases in Figure 4.1. The first six steps (from Step 1 to Step 6) comprise the
identification phase. The rest of the steps comprise the authentication phase.
Every UMTS/LTE user has a USIM that contains an 〈IMSI,K〉 pair. An
HN maintains a database of such pairs, one pair for each of its subscribers. One
1The UMTS and EPS AKA are also known as 3G and LTE AKA, respectively.
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important assumption is that the permanent key K is known only by the USIM
and the HN.2
4.1.1 Identification
In the following, we describe the identification phase step-by-step, as depicted in
Figure 4.1:
(1) In a radio connection request message, the UE sends one of its identities in
an attempt to connect to the SN. If the UE has a TMSI or a GUTI that
the SN assigned previously, the UE sends the TMSI or GUTI, otherwise
the UE can send its IMSI [94, 95].
(2) Using the received TMSI or GUTI in Step 1, the SN tries to resolve the
IMSI from its lookup table. If the SN cannot find the TMSI or GUTI in
the lookup table, then the SN continues from Step 3. If the SN received
the IMSI itself in Step 1 or can resolve the IMSI using the TMSI or GUTI,
the SN jumps to Step 5.
(3) The SN sends an identity request to the UE.
(4) The UE sends a response to identity request by sending the IMSI in clear-
text. Please note that sending the response in cleartext is a weakness that
is exploited by the IMSI catchers to attack users’ identity privacy.
(5) The SN checks if it has a pre-fetched unused Authentication Vector (AV)
for the user. If yes, then the SN jumps to Step 9. Otherwise, the SN
continues from Step 6.
(6) The SN resolves the HN name from the MCC and MNC part of the IMSI
and sends an AV request to the HN. The AV request includes the IMSI.
In case of requesting for an EPS AV (sometimes called LTE AV), the SN
includes the fields SNid and “network type” to indicate the LTE network.
3
The SNid consists of MCC and MNC of the SN, and is encoded as described
in 3GPP TS 33.401 [58, Annex A.2].
2It is not feasible for an attacker to read the permanent key K from the USIM due to the
tamper resistance of the UICC that hosts the USIM. Also, the HN employs state-of-the-art
security mechanisms to protect the database of 〈IMSI,K〉 pairs from unauthorised access.
3In 5G, SNname is used instead of SNid. The SNname includes the network type, e.g., 5G (see
Subsection 4.2.1).







(1) IMSI or TMSI or GUTI
(2) if SN can resolve IMSI, then jump to Step (5)
(3) user identity request
(4) IMSI
(5) if SN has a pre-fetched, unused AV, then
jump to Step (9)
(6) AV request
(IMSI, [SNid], [network type])
(7.1) choose RAND ∈ {0, 1}128 randomly
(7.2) MAC = f1(K,AMF, SQN,RAND)
(7.3) XRES = f2(K,RAND)
(7-4) CK = f3(K,RAND)
(7.5) IK = f4(K,RAND)
(7.6) AK = f5(K,RAND)
(7.7) KASME = KDF (CK||IK, SNid, SQN⊕AK)







(10.1) AK = f5(K,RAND)
(10.2) XMAC = f1(K,AMF, SQN,RAND)
(10.5) verify MAC = XMAC
(10.6) verify SQN is in the correct range
(10.3) RES = f2(K,RAND)
(10.4) CK = f3(K,RAND)
(10.5) IK = f4(K,RAND)
(10.6) KASME = KDF (CK||IK, SNid, SQN⊕AK)
(11) authentication response (RES)
(12) verify XRES = RES
(13) Location update (IMSI)
Figure 4.1: UMTS/EPS AKA.
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4.1.2 Authentication
To describe the authentication phase, we continue the numbering of the steps
from the identification phase. In the following, we describe the authentication
phase step-by-step, as depicted in Figure 4.1:
(7) In this step, the HN prepares an AV. If the “network type” field is not
present in the authentication request sent by the SN, then the HN prepares
a UMTS AV (sometimes called 3G AV). Otherwise, the HN prepares an
EPS AV. We explain these two AVs in the following:
– UMTS Authentication Vector: A UMTS AV includes the follow-
ing: (i) a 128-bit long random challenge called RAND, (ii) a bit string
XRES which is the expected response to the challenge (iii) two keys
called CK and IK to be used as confidentiality and integrity keys be-
tween the UE and the SN, and (iv) an authentication token AUTN.
The construction of an UMTS AV is described in 3GPP TS 33.102
[54, Clause 6.3.2]. The message authentication code MAC, expected
response of the challenge XRES, confidentiality key CK, integrity key
IK, and anonymity key AK are computed using one-way functions
f1, f2, f3, f4, and f5 respectively. The AUTN is a concatenation of a
bunch of parameters (explained later in this step): SQN⊕AK, AMF,
and MAC.
The input parameters of function f1 are the following: K,AMF, SQN
and RAND. The AMF is a 16-bit long string, used to indicate different
meta-information about the AV to the USIM [54]. For example, the
HN sets the most significant bit (also called the separation bit) of the
authentication management field (AMF) to “0” to indicate the UE
that the associated AV is not meant for LTE uses [47, p. 117]. The
sequence number SQN is a counter maintained by the HN for each
of its users. The counter increases each time the HN generates an
AV for the user. See Annex C.1.1 in 3GPP TS 33.102 for details on
SQN.4 The other four functions (f2, f3, f4, f5) take two inputs: the
permanent key K and the random challenge RAND.
The 3GPP standards do not require functions f1, f2, f3, f4, and f5
to be standardised; this is because these functions are used in the
USIM and HN, both of which are managed by the same entity, i.e.,
4The SQN plays a central role in defeating replay attacks.
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the HN. However, a set of informative example algorithms for these
functions have been developed by a special task force within 3GPP.
This set is called MILENAGE, and the specifications are documented
in 3GPP TS 35.205, TS 35.206, TS 35.207, TS 35.208 [96–99]. Niemi
and Nyberg [1] have discussed the MILENAGE algorithm.
– EPS Authentication Vector: An EPS AV includes (i) a 128-bit
long random challenge called RAND, (ii) a bit string XRES which is
the expected response to the challenge, (iii) a key called KASME to be
used as a local master key in the SN, and (iv) an authentication token
AUTN. The RAND and XRES are computed in the same way as they
are computed in the above discussion. Unlike UMTS, the separation
bit of AMF in the AUTN is set to “1”. All the other parameters in
the AUTN, i.e., SQN,AK, and MAC are constructed in the same way
as in UMTS.
An EPS AV does not include the keys CK, IK. Instead, it includes
the key KASME derived (explained later in this step) from the keys
CK, IK and SN identity SNid. The introduction of the key KASME was
necessary due to the decision of using 3G USIM in LTE, and the new
requirement of cryptographic network separation. The key KASME has
an additional desirable effect: it reduces the frequency with which AVs
need to be fetched from the HN. Reasons for introducing KASME are
discussed by Forsberg et al. [47, p. 101].
To derive the key KASME, the HN uses the key derivation function
KDF , which is defined in 3GPP TS 33.220 [67]. The KDF func-
tion computes a hash of an input string based on the input key. In
Figure 4.1, we present the KDF function in a simple way by show-
ing only those parameters which are involved in our discussion. More
parameters are involved in the actual computation. In our simplified
notation, the first parameter is the key for the hashing, and the rest of
the parameters are used to construct the message according to 3GPP
TS 33.401 [58, Annex A.2].
The lengths of different authentication parameters that are used to
construct an AV are defined in Subsection 6.3.7 of 3GPP TS 33.102
[54]. The key KASME is 256 bits long, but it still has a key entropy of
only 128 bits when it is derived from the permanent key K which has
128 bits.5
5The permanent key can be of different lengths, as discussed in Subsection 2.2.3.
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(8) The HN forwards the AV to the SN. If the SN sent an authentication request
for a UMTS AKA, then the HN forwards the UMTS AV. If the SN sent an
authentication request for an EPS AKA, then the HN forwards the EPS
AV.
(9) The SN stores the (XRES,CK, IK) in case of UMTS AKA. In the case of
EPS AKA, the SN stores (XRES,KASME). Then the SN forwards RAND
and AUTN to the UE.
(10) Upon receiving the RAND and AUTN, the ME transfers RAND and AUTN
to the USIM. The USIM does a series of computations, similar to the
computations that the HN did to construct the AV in Step 7.
The USIM first computes the anonymity key AK = f5(K,RAND), retrieves
the sequence number SQN = (SQN ⊕ AK) ⊕ AK, and computes XMAC
in the same way the HN computed MAC. It compares this XMAC with
MAC which is included in AUTN. If the two are different, the UE sends
an authentication failure message back to the SN with an indication of the
cause and abandons the procedure.
The USIM then verifies the freshness of the AV by checking whether the
received sequence number SQN is in the correct range, as described in the
Annex C.2.2 in 3GPP TS 33.102 [54]. If the verification fails, the UE sends
an authentication failure message back to the SN with an indication of the
cause, and the UE abandons the procedure. The synchronisation failure
message contains the parameter AUTS. Algorithms for constructing AUTS
are described in 3GPP TS 33.102 [54].
If the verifications mentioned above are positive, the USIM computes RES,
CK, and IK in the same way that the HN computed XRES,CK, and IK in
Step 7. The USIM returns RES,CK, and IK to the ME. At this point, the
ME treats the involved HN and SN as authentic.
If the separation bit is set to “0” then the AV is usable only in legacy
contexts such as GSM and UMTS [58, Clause 6.1.2]. If the separation bit
is set to “1”, then the AV is usable in LTE [58, Clause 6.1.2] and 5G [57,
Clause 6.1.3.2] contexts.
The ME checks whether the separation bit of the AMF is set correctly.
If the separation bit is set to “1” and the UE is connecting to an LTE
network, then the ME computes KASME using key CK||IK using the KDF
function in the same way as the HN computed KASME in Step 7. If the
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separation bit is not set correctly, then the ME sends an authentication
failure message back to the SN with an indication of the cause [47, p. 122].
(11) The ME responds to the SN by sending a user authentication response
message that includes RES.
(12) The SN checks if the RES equals XRES. If so, the SN considers the user
to be authentic. If not, depending on the type of identity used by the UE
in the identification phase, the SN may initiate further identity requests,
i.e., go back to Step 3, or send an authentication-reject message towards
the UE (see 3GPP TS 24.301 [100]).6
(13) If the UE connected to the SN for the first time and the authentication
was successful, then the SN sends a Location Update (LU) message to the
HN by including the IMSI of the subscriber [101–103]. Please note that the
message is called update location request in 3GPP TS 33.401 [102]. Due
to the LU message, the HN knows the SN in which the user can be found.
After successful and affirmative completion of the AKA, more algorithm-
specific cryptographic keys between the UE and SN are established based on
KASME. To indicate the selected algorithms and to start ciphering and integrity
protection, two Security Mode Command (SMC) procedures are used. Some
cryptographic data protection already starts during the run of SMC procedures.
Other cryptographic protection starts after the SMC procedures complete. Fors-
berg et al. [47, Chapter 8] have discussed the SMC procedures and starts of
cryptographic protection.
4.2 5G AKA
The primary purpose of the 5G AKA is the same as LTE AKA, i.e., authentica-
tion and key agreement between the UE and the network. Nevertheless, 5G AKA
has two main additions. One is privacy-preserving identification: a 5G user sends
a SUCI – a privacy-preserving identity, instead of its long-term identity SUPI.
The other is increased home control: the HN obtains cryptographically secure
confirmation that the authentication between the SN and UE has been successful,
i.e., the SN cannot lie about the success of the authentication.
6We do not present the authentication failure/reject messages in Figure 4.1.
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In this section, we describe first the privacy-preserving identification phase of
5G AKA. Then we describe the authentication part of 5G AKA and explain how
it achieves increased home control. Since the privacy-preserving identification is
a major improvement in 5G, we present the identification phase using a separate
figure before explaining the authentication phase.
4.2.1 Identification
The identification process of a 5G user is defined in 3GPP TS 33.501 [57,
Clause 6.1.2]. We have written out the process in Figure 4.2. In the follow-
ing, we explain the process step-by-step:
(1) In a radio connection request message, the UE sends one of its identities
in an attempt to connect to the SN. The UE first checks if it has a valid
5G-GUTI that can be used to identify itself to the SN. If not, it jumps to
Step 6.
(2) The UE sends the 5G-GUTI to the SN.
(3) The SN checks if it has a SUPI mapped to the 5G-GUTI. If not, it jumps
to Step 5.
(4) The SN sends an authentication request message to the HN. The request
includes the SUPI of the user and the SNname. The SNname is the concate-
nation of a service code and the SNid with a separation character “:” such
that the service code prepends the SNid. The value of the service code is
set to “5G” to indicate that the authentication is intended between a 5G
core and a UE [57, Clause 6.1.1.4]. At this point, the identification process
ends.
(5) The SN sends an identity request to the UE.
(6) The UE computes a SUCI of the user. The UE constructs a SUCI by
encrypting the SUPI, using the public key of the HN. The details of how a
SUCI is constructed are specified in 3GPP TS 33.501, in Annex C [57]. It is
also summarised by Khan and Martin [92]. We presented a brief overview
of the mechanism in Paper III7.
7The UE conceals the 5G user’s long-term identities with Elliptic Curve Integrated En-
cryption Scheme (ECIES) [104, 105] before sending them to the SN. The ECIES is a hybrid
encryption scheme that combines elliptic-curve-based public-key cryptography with secret key









(1) if UE does not have 5G-GUTI,
jump to Step (6)
(2) 5G-GUTI
(3) if SUPI can not be resolved
from the 5G-GUTI, jump to Step (5)
(4) UE Authentication Authenticate
Request (SUPI, SNname)
(5) user identity request





(9) deconceal SUCI using skHN
Figure 4.2: Identification of a 5G User.
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(7) The UE sends the SUCI to identify itself in the registration request message
to the SN.
(8) The SN sends an authentication request message to the HN. The message
includes the SUCI and the SNname. The construction of SNname is explained
in Step 4 above.
(9) The HN decrypts the SUPI of the user from the SUCI, using the HN’s
private key. Details are specified in Annex C of 3GPP TS 33.501 [57]. At
this point, the identification process ends.
Introduction of SUCI fixes the vulnerability in the identification procedure
in the 5G network. This is because the UE would never send its SUPI to the
SN in plaintext except when the UE chooses to use the null-scheme to compute
the SUCI. The null-scheme uses the identity function instead of a real encryp-
tion/decryption function. In practice, it is equivalent to skipping the encryption.
For technical reasons, it is more convenient to have an explicit scheme instead
of bypassing the encryption step. It is unlikely that an IMSI catcher would be
able to trick a UE to use the null-scheme by sending an identity request. This is
because the UE shall generate a SUCI using “null-scheme” only in the following
cases [57, Section 6.12]:
• the UE is setting up an unauthenticated emergency session, and it does not
have a 5G-GUTI to the chosen PLMN, or
• the home network has configured “null-scheme” to be used, or
• the home network has not provisioned the public key needed to generate a
SUCI.
Please note that the SUCI contains parts of the SUPI in plaintext. For
example, MCC and MNC, which are needed for routing the SUCI to the HN, are
not encrypted [111]. Due to this routing-related information sent in plaintext,
SUCI may not provide strong privacy. For example, when only one user, who is
cryptography; it is a semantically secure probabilistic encryption scheme ensuring that suc-
cessive encryptions of the same plaintext with the same public key result in different cipher-
texts with very high probability. Specifically, [57] includes two ECIES profiles, both for the
approximately 128-bit security level. Both profiles use AES-128 [106] in CTR mode [25] for
confidentiality and HMAC-SHA-256 [107, 108] for authenticity in the secret key cryptography
part but use either Curve25519 [109, 110] or secp256r1 [105] elliptic curves for the public key
cryptography part.
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known to an IMSI catcher, of an HN is roaming to a particular place, the IMSI
catcher can track the user. The IMSI catcher would send an identity request
to all the UEs that try to camp on it; when the users respond to the identity
request by sending SUCI, the IMSI catcher observes only the MCC and MNC
parts disregarding the encrypted part of the SUCI. If there is only one UE that
sends the MCC and MNC of the targeted user’s HN, then the IMSI catcher may
infer that they most probably come from the UE of the targeted user.
4.2.2 Authentication
The authentication process in 5G is defined in 3GPP TS 33.501 [57]. We have
presented the 5G authentication process in Figure 4.3. In the following, we
explain the process step-by-step:
(1) First, the HN generates an AV as specified in 3GPP TS 33.102 [54]. So,
the RAND,MAC,XRES,CK, IK,AK, and AUTN are generated in the same
way they are generated in 3G/LTE. In addition, in 5G, the HN generates
a few more strings that are described below:
– The HN generates key KAUSF using the KDF function.
8 The KDF
function computes a hash of an input message using the input key.
The input key to the KDF function is CK||IK. Some other inputs are
SNname and SQN⊕AK. The construction of the input message to the
KDF function is specified in 3GPP TS 33.501 [57, Annex A.2].
– The expected response XRES∗ is also computed using the KDF func-
tion. The input key is CK||IK. The other inputs are SNname, RAND,
XRES. The construction of the input message to the KDF function
is specified in 3GPP TS 33.501 [57, Annex A.4].
– The key KSEAF is also computed using the KDF function. The input
key is KAUSF. The other input is SNname. The construction of the
input message to the KDF function is specified in 3GPP TS 33.501
[57, Annex A.6].
– A hash digest HXRES∗ of RAND||XRES∗ is also computed using the
hash function SHA-256, as specified in 3GPP TS 33.501 [57, An-
nex A.5].
(2) The HN forwards RAND||AUTN||HXRES∗ to the SN.
8The KDF function is explained in Section 4.1.







(1.1) choose RAND ∈ {0, 1}128 randomly
(1.2) MAC = f1(K,AMF, SQN,RAND)
(1.3) XRES = f2(K,RAND)
(1-4) CK = f3(K,RAND)
(1.5) IK = f4(K,RAND)
(1.6) AK = f5(K,RAND)
(1.7) AUTN = SQN⊕AK||AMF||MAC
(1.8) KAUSF = KDF (CK||IK, SNname, SQN⊕AK)
(1.9) XRES∗ = KDF (CK||IK, SNname,RAND,XRES)
(1.10) KSEAF = KDF (KAUSF, SNname)





(4.1) AK = f5(K,RAND)
(4.2) XMAC = f1(K,AMF, SQN,RAND)
(4.3) verify MAC = XMAC
(4.4) verify SQN is in the correct range
(4.5) RES = f2(K,RAND)
(4.6) CK = f3(K,RAND)
(4.7) IK = f4(K,RAND)
(4.8) RES∗ = KDF (CK||IK, SNname,RAND,RES)
(4.9) KAUSF = KDF (CK||IK, SNname, SQN⊕AK)
(4.10) KSEAF = KDF (KAUSF, SNname)
(5) authentication response (RES∗)
(6.1) HRES∗ = SHA-256(RAND||RES∗)
(6.2) verify HRES∗ = HXRES∗
(7) RES∗
(8) verify XRES∗ = RES∗
(9) KSEAF,[SUPI]
Figure 4.3: 5G AKA.
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(3) The SN forwards RAND||AUTN to the UE.
(4) The UE forwards the RAND||AUTN to the USIM. The USIM performs a
series of computation similar to those in the HN, i.e., the USIM generates
AK,XMAC,CK, IK,RES and verifies MAC, and SQN in the same way as
described in Section 4.1. The USIM forwards CK, IK, and RES to the
ME. The ME computes RES∗,KAUSF, and KSEAF, in the same way as
XRES∗,KAUSF,KSEAF are generated in the HN.
(5) The ME forwards RES∗ to the UE.
(6) The SN computes HRES∗ in the same way the HN computed HXRES∗.
Then the SN verifies whether HRES∗ and HXRES∗ are equal or not. If
they are equal, the authentication is considered to be successful from the
SN point of view. If not equal, authentication is unsuccessful from SN point
of view. However, in either case, the SN continues from Step 7 to Step 9.
In case the authentication is unsuccessful, the SN sends a message to the
UE as explained below after Step 9.
(7) The SN forwards RES∗ to the HN.
(8) The HN verifies whether XRES∗ and RES∗ are equal or not. If they are
equal, then HN considers that the authentication was successful between
the SN and the UE from the HN point of view.
(9) The HN responds to the SN in an authentication response message whether
the authentication was successful from the HN point of view or not. If the
authentication was successful, the HN includes the anchor key KSEAF in
the authentication response. The HN may optionally include the SUPI in
the authentication response if the SN sent a SUCI in the authentication
request message, as shown in Step 8 of Figure 4.2.
If the HN, in Step 9, has indicated that the authentication was not successful
in the HN, or if the authentication was not successful in the SN in Step 7, then
the SN shall do the following. The SN shall reject the authentication by sending
an authentication-reject message to the UE if the SUCI was used by the UE in
the previous identification procedure. If the UE did not use the SUCI in the
previous identification procedure, then the only alternative identity that the UE
could have used was 5G-GUTI. The SN shall initiate an identification procedure
with the UE if the UE used 5G-GUTI in the previous identification procedure.
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Once the UE responds to the SN with a SUCI in the identification procedure,
the SN may initiate an additional authentication procedure.
After successful and affirmative completion of the AKA, the SN uses the
key KSEAF, and the SUPI to derive a key named KAMF according to 3GPP TS
33.501 [57, Annex A.7]. The key KAMF is used to derive further keys, which
are used in providing ciphering and integrity protection for various layers of
communication. If the UE used a SUCI during identification, then the SN would
provide communication services to the UE only after the HN sent SUPI to the
SN [57, Clause 6.1.3.2].
To indicate the selected algorithms and to start ciphering and integrity pro-
tection, two Security Mode Command (SMC) procedures are used [57]. Some
cryptographic data protection already starts during the run of SMC procedures.
Other cryptographic protection starts after the SMC procedures complete. The
reason for not starting all protection at the same time is that sometimes the cryp-
tographic keys needed for the protection can already be determined during the
SMC run-time, but sometimes the keys cannot be determined before the SMC
procedure is complete. The SMC procedures are explained in 3GPP TS 33.501
[57].
Increased Home Control
In UMTS or LTE, an SN can send a Location Update (LU) message to an HN;
please see Step 13 in Figure 4.1. The LU message includes the IMSI of a sub-
scriber. According to the specification [101, 102], the SN should send an LU
message in some defined situations, for example, when the user uses IMSI to
connect to the SN and the subsequent authentication becomes successful. How-
ever, a malicious SN may send a fake LU message after an unsuccessful AKA
run. The rationale of such malicious behaviour is discussed in Paper II. If the
SN sends a fake location update message, the HN cannot detect the malicious
behaviour. This is because the location update message does not include any
cryptographic measure that can enable such detection at the HN end.
In 5G, the use of XRES∗ and RES∗ enables the HN to be convinced that the
correct UE has indeed run the AKA with the SN and that the authentication
result is positive. This is because the right UE is the only party besides the HN
that can compute RES∗. Therefore, if the SN returns the right RES∗ in Step 7,
then it would imply that the correct UE participated in the AKA. At this stage,
the HN would also update the location of the UE. However, if the RES∗ returned
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in Step 7 is wrong, then the HN would notice it in Step 8 and consequently,
would not update the UE’s location or return the anchor key KSEAF in Step 9.
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Chapter 5
Defending Against IMSI Catchers
The threat of IMSI catchers, as explained in Subsection 3.2.1, is not just a the-
oretical possibility. They are real entities that have become a commonplace in
large cities [112] and airports [113]. Besides, IMSI catchers have increasingly
become cheaper and easier to use for an adversary [60].
5.1 Related Work
A significant volume of work has been dedicated in the last three decades miti-
gating the threat of IMSI catchers. Most of the efforts on mitigating the threat
of IMSI catchers can be put in two categories: (i) detecting and (ii) defeating.
However, not all efforts fall into one of these two categories. An example of such
an effort is the legal prohibition of using IMSI catchers. This thesis focuses on
defeating techniques. In the following, we briefly refer to the detecting techniques
and then point to a relatively large number of studies on defeating techniques.
5.1.1 Techniques for Detecting IMSI Catchers
Techniques in this category mainly operate by gathering information about a
cellular network, analysing the gathered information for anomalies and warning
users/operators about the presence of an IMSI catcher [10]. Park et al. [10]
mentioned a list of such techniques. The techniques involve additional measures
on top of the standard cellular network protocols, e.g., using applications installed
in the user device. Once warned, the user abstains from communicating with the
detected IMSI catcher.
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Although detection of IMSI catchers typically prevents severe attacks such
as downgrading attacks, they can still be used to violate identity privacy. This
is because, by the time a user can detect an IMSI catcher, the IMSI catcher
may already have tricked the user revealing the IMSI. Also, the detectors are
not completely accurate. They may produce false positive and false negative
detection [8–10].
5.1.2 Techniques for Defeating IMSI Catchers
Techniques that fall under the category of defeating IMSI catchers typically in-
volve cryptographic measures so that IMSI catchers can neither trick users into
revealing their IMSI nor deduce the presence of a specific target user. Typically,
these techniques are transparent to the user, i.e., they do not require any extra
measures on top of running the standard cellular network protocols.
The IMSI catchers would be completely defeated when all vulnerabilities that
IMSI catchers can exploit are fixed. A few of these vulnerabilities are mentioned
in Subsection 3.2.1, and a summary of these vulnerabilities is presented by Khan
and Martin [92]. However, this thesis focuses on the most easily exploitable
vulnerability (in the identification procedure) and keeps the other vulnerabilities
out of the primary focus.
Most of the efforts towards defeating IMSI catchers have been on fixing the
vulnerability, as explained in Subsection 3.2.1, in the identification procedure.
We identified trends of solutions based on the following three mechanisms: (i)
group-key, (ii) pseudonyms, and (iii) public-key cryptography. In Paper III, a
list of such works is presented. However, for the sake of fewer interruptions in
reading this thesis, in the following, we reuse some of the text from Section 3 of
Paper III.
Solutions Based on Group-key In this mechanism, a group of users use the
same symmetric key to encrypt the response of the “user identification request”.
The UE sends the resulting chiphertext along with the identity of the group key,
MCC, and MNC in plaintext so that the SN can send the chiphertext and the
identity of the group key to the correct HN. The HN uses the identity of the
group key for resolving the key and decrypts the ciphertext.
If the number of users in a group is k, then a user in the group is expected
to achieve k-anonymity. So, a large k may appear to be desirable. However, if a
group is too large, then the symmetric key would be shared by many users, and
anyone belonging to the group can decrypt the encrypted response. Ginzboorg
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and Niemi [4] have explained the group-key-based solution, its challenges, and
why it was eventually not adopted although 3GPP has seriously considered it for
a long time for 3G already.
Solutions Based on Pseudonyms This kind of solutions uses users’ tempo-
rary identities, known as pseudonyms. A user uses its pseudonyms to identify
itself so that no one else but the HN can resolve a long-term identity of the user
who uses the pseudonym. The detailed workings of pseudonyms are discussed in
Subsection 5.4.1.
In a proposal by Herzberg et al. [114], one-time pseudonyms are created by
probabilistic encryption of the user’s identity using a key that is known only by
the HN. The HN sends a set of pseudonyms to the UE when the UE and the HN
have a secure communication channel.
Several publications [4, 60–62] propose using pseudonyms in the same format
as IMSI, but with randomised and frequently changing MSIN.1 In solutions pro-
posed by Broek et al. [60], and Khan and Mitchell [62], the pseudonym’s update
is embedded in a random challenge, RAND of AKA. Khan and Mitchell [103]
identified a weakness in solutions proposing cellular network pseudonyms in the
same format as IMSI, which could be exploited to de-synchronize pseudonyms in
the UE and the HN. Khan and Mitchell [103] also proposed a fix.
In Paper II, we discuss how the weakness could be exploited to mount a
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack against the HN. Paper II has also
found a weakness in the fix that is proposed by Khan and Mitchell [103]. In
Paper II, we have proposed a different fix that is simpler than that by Khan and
Mitchell [103].
Solutions Based on Public-key Cryptography Asokan [115] described how
public key encryption could be used to achieve identity privacy in mobile envi-
ronments. Arapinis et al. [71, Figure 8] also proposed similar public-key-based
solution. In these solutions, only the HN has a public/private key pair, and the
UE is provisioned with the public key of the HN. The UE encrypts identity infor-
mation using the public key of the HN before sending it to the HN. Køien [116]
suggests using Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) to defeat IMSI catchers in LTE.
1An IMSI has three parts: MCC, MNC, and MSIN. These parts are explained in 2.2.4.
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5.2 Outline of Our Contributions
Our contributions to mitigate the threat of IMSI catchers fall in the category of
defeating IMSI catchers. The threat of IMSI catchers is mitigated in the stan-
dards of the first release of 5G. The 5G standards have adopted the Elliptic Curve
Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES), which is a public-key cryptosystem, to-
wards defeating the IMSI catchers (see Subsection 4.2.2). Nevertheless, Paper I
includes a complementary solution that could be used in certain use cases.
This thesis also includes solutions to defeat IMSI catchers in 3G and LTE.2
Defeating IMSI catchers in the legacy networks involves a huge additional chal-
lenge on top of the challenges researchers faced while developing a new solution
to defeat IMSI catchers in 5G. This challenge is due to the existing widespread
deployment of LTE and 3G networks. If an IMSI-catcher-immune 3G/LTE user
sends a privacy-protected message to a 3G/LTE SN that is not yet patched to
handle such a message, the successive authentication may not succeed at all even
if both the UE and SN were legitimate. In Paper II, we discuss a solution based
on pseudonyms, which requires only a relatively small effort to patch the existing
3G/LTE SNs.
Even though IMSI catchers are defeated in 5G, it is important to notice that
a 5G user still remains vulnerable to IMSI catchers when the user uses LTE, 3G,
or GSM networks. In Paper III, we discuss a mechanism that can defeat IMSI
catchers in 5G, as well as in all legacy networks. This mechanism is a hybrid
of the solution presented in Paper II and the 3GPP-adopted solution to defeat
IMSI catchers in 5G.
5.3 Defending against IMSI Catchers in 5G
This section is based on Paper I. In 5G, the most easily exploitable vulnerability
(the one in the identification procedure) and some of the other vulnerabilities that
IMSI catchers exploit are fixed. Khan and Martin [92] have summarised a list of
these fixes in their survey paper on subscription privacy in 5G. However, IMSI
catchers may still exploit other vulnerabilities that are not yet fixed in 5G [92].
These left-out vulnerabilities are related to (i) the authentication failure messages
sent by the UE to the SN [71], and (ii) paging messages triggered by sending
2We do not delve into defeating IMSI catchers in 2G because an attacker can mount even
more serious attacks on a 2G user by taking a man-in-the-middle position[11]. The major
weakness in 2G is that the user does not authenticate the network.
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(preferably hidden) SMS-like content to the victim [72]. These vulnerabilities
are arguably less harmful than the vulnerability in the identification procedure.
This is because an IMSI catcher has to know some identity of the target victim
before exploiting these vulnerabilities and can mount the attack on one victim at
a time. In contrast, to exploit the vulnerability in the identification procedure,
the IMSI catcher does not need to know any identity of a victim beforehand and
can mount the attack on all the UEs present in its radio coverage. This thesis
keeps the arguably less harmful vulnerabilities out of scope and focuses on the
vulnerability in the identification procedure.
During the standardisation of the first phase of 5G, different solutions to fix
the vulnerability in the identification procedure were proposed. These proposals
were made both in the academic literature (as discussed in Subsection 5.1.2) and
in the standardisation study document [21].
In Paper I, we briefly outlined principles of eight different candidate solutions
based on different cryptographic techniques to fix the vulnerability in the iden-
tification procedure. The techniques include the use of pseudonyms (temporary
identity assigned to a user by the HN) and different public-key cryptography
schemes, e.g., certificate-based or identity-based.
In Paper I, we have discussed three variants of the certificate-based technique:
Variant 1, Variant 2 and Variant 3. These variants differ from each other in the
way the Certificate Authorities (CAs) constitute the Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI).
Variant 1 is similar to the contemporary certificate-based solution used in
Transport Layer Security (TLS). The SN presents a digital certificate to the UE,
which the UE verifies. If the verification is successful, the UE uses the public
key of the SN to encrypt the IMSI and sends the encrypted IMSI to the SN. For
certificate verification, a root CA is provisioned to the UE beforehand.
In Variant 2, a UE considers only its HN as the root CA, which means the
chain of signatures in the certificate presented by the SN has to include a signa-
ture signed by the HN. Otherwise, the certificate verification would not succeed.
In Variant 3, only the HN can act as a CA; this means a certificate would have
a chain of only one signature, which is signed by the HN. Therefore, in Variant
3, it suffices if the HN provisions the UE with the set of trusted SNs with their
respective public-keys.
In all of the three variants, the SN can decrypt the encrypted response (to
“identity request”) sent by the UE. Therefore, the SN can know the identity of
the user without the assistance of the HN.
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We also have discussed one public-key-based solution (we call it root-key-based
solution), which is in principle similar to those proposed by Arapinis et al. [71],
and Asokan [115]. The root-key-based solution does not need any PKI at all.
Please note that the root-key-based solution is in principle the same as the SUCI-
based solution (see Subsection 4.2.1) adopted by 3GPP to defeat the vulnerability
in 5G.
In Paper I, we have briefly discussed two IBE-based schemes: (i) JPL, which
is named after the initials of its authors, and (ii) Privacy-Enhanced Mutual Au-
thentication protocol (PEMMA). In the following, we explain the principle of our
IBE-based solution. In Paper I, we have presented this solution in greater detail
compared to the other candidate solutions (for which only the core principles are
stated). In this section, we present a qualitative comparative analysis (in greater
detail than in Paper I) between the aforementioned candidates.
5.3.1 IBE-based Solution
One of the two main contributions in Paper I is presenting a new solution to fix
the vulnerability in the identification procedure using Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE). The fix in the identification procedure is extended into a mutual authen-
tication protocol that we call the Privacy-Enhanced Fast Mutual Authentication
(PEFMA) protocol, which can co-exist along with the native AKA protocol. We
sketched out the co-existence mechanism using a flow diagram. The protocol is
faster than AKA when the HN is located far. This is because PEFMA does not
require fetching an AV from the HN each time it runs, and consequently, saves
the time of a round-trip from the SN to HN. The other main contribution of
Paper I is a qualitative comparison between all the candidate solutions based on
thirteen measuring criteria.
IBE [83] is a public-key cryptographic technique. In the following, we present
an overview of the workings of a general IBE system. Such an overview is also
presented with a figure in Section 4.2 of Paper I. Then, we introduce the principle
of PEFMA and present a summary of the qualitative comparison between the
candidate solutions.
How IBE Works
To use IBE in a communication system, a third party, which is known as a
Private Key Generator (PKG), has to be trusted by all the participants of the
communication system. A sender computes a receiver’s public key as a function
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of the identity of the receiver and the public key of the PKG. So, the PKG has
to securely provide the sender with the PKG’s public key before the sender sends
an encrypted message to the receiver. The PKG computes the receiver’s private
key as a function of the identity of the receiver and the private key of the PKG.
The receiver obtains its private key from the PKG over a secure channel, which
implies that an IBE system does not require a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Indeed, the sender does not need to authenticate the public key of the receiver
(PKG authenticates the receiver). Therefore, no CA is required.
A fair amount of trust is required to be put in the PKG. This is because
unlike CAs in the certificate-based public-key cryptography, the PKG knows all
the private keys used in the system.
In a public-key-based cryptographic protocol, changing a key is trickier than
in symmetric-key-based ones. When a symmetric key is compromised, establish-
ing a new symmetric key is usually sufficient to defeat the attacker who possesses
the compromised key. However, generating a new public/private key pair is not
sufficient to defeat an attacker who possesses the compromised private key –
the attacker can still impersonate the receiver whose private key has been com-
promised. The compromised key must be revoked so that a sender can verify
whether the public key presented by the receiver is revoked or not.
In IBE, since the keys of a receiver are functions of its identity, revoking
the key of the receiver needs some extra care compared to that needed in the
certificate-based system. This is because if revoking the key of a receiver requires
revoking the identity of the receiver, then for an operational system, key revo-
cations may cause too many interruptions to function smoothly. Usually, this
difficulty of key revocation in IBE is resolved by concatenating a Private Vali-
dation Token (PVT) to the identity of the receiver in computing the keys of the
receiver. When a revocation is required, instead of revoking the whole identity,
only the PVT is revoked. This allows a new PVT to be assigned to the receiver.
PEFMA
We call our solution towards defeating IMSI catchers in 5G PEFMA, which is
based on IBE. In PEFMA, the HN takes the role of the PKG. The HN chooses an
Expiry Timestamp (ET) as the PVT for the UE and computes a private key for
the UE using the IMSI, ET, and the private key of the HN. Then the HN securely
provisions the UE with the HN’s public key, ET, and the UE’s private key. The
HN also provisions the UE with a list of all the trusted SNs, marking the SNs
which are PEFMA-enabled. When a roaming agreement is signed between the
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HN and an SN, the HN chooses an ET for the SN and provision the SN with the
HN’s public key, ET, and the SN’s private key.
These keys, ETs, and list of SNs need to be re-provisioned on different occa-
sions, e.g., when ET is due, or when an associated key is compromised/revoked.
In some cases, even though provisioning is needed, it cannot be done. For ex-
ample, provisioning is not allowed when a UE is roaming. To enable the use of
a 3G/LTE USIM in 5G, the provisioning needs to be done to the ME instead of
the USIM. In Section 4.4 of Paper I, we have presented an outline of when these
provisionings are needed, and when they can be done.
When an SN sends the “identity request” (written as “IMSI inquiry” in
Paper I), the UE computes the public key of the SN using the identity of the SN
(and an ET that is specified by the HN) and the public key of the HN. Then
the UE encrypts the intended response (to the identity request), using the SN’s
public key. The response includes IMSI and two ETs – one for UE (encrypted)
and one for SN (in plaintext). The UE also sends the MCC, MNC, and public-
key identity of the HN in plaintext so that the SN can query the correct HN to
obtain the SN’s private key (if it does not have it yet).
Once the SN obtains its private key, it decrypts the encrypted response that
the UE sent. The SN is now equipped with required materials (IMSI and ET of
the user, and the public key of the HN) to compute the public key of the UE.
Thus, neither the public key nor the identity of the UE is sent in cleartext over
the radio channel. Therefore, the vulnerability in the identification procedure is
fixed.
At this point, both the UE and SN know their respective private keys and each
other’s public keys. The UE and SN, in principle, can use these keys in different
ways to exchange signatures or encrypted messages or both for achieving mutual
authentication and establishing symmetric cryptographic keys.
In PEFMA, the UE and SN ensure authenticated and confidentiality pro-
tected exchanges of two random strings RAND1 (chosen by UE) and RAND2
(chosen by SN). They sign RAND1 and RAND2 using their respective private
keys. They verify the signatures using each other’s public keys. The UE and SN
can use a Key Derivation Function (KDF) using the two random strings as pa-
rameters to compute different symmetric keys. Thus, a privacy-enhanced mutual
authentication protocol is obtained. Please look into Paper I for details.
The primary motivation for running PEFMA is to fix the vulnerability in the
identification procedure. In our solution, it is the UE that initiates PEFMA. So,
when the SN obtains the identity of the UE, the SN is free to choose to discontinue
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running the PEFMA protocol and instead may choose to run the native AKA
protocol. In some cases, the SN may prefer running AKA to PEFMA.
The SN’s preference to AKA could be due to the relatively low computation
cost (because of symmetric-key operations) and communication cost (because of
shorter ciphertext and message authentication code instead of digital signature)
incurred by AKA. Nevertheless, the SN could choose to run PEFMA when ob-
taining an AV is expensive due to, e.g., the HN being located at a far distance.
Another reason could be that the HN has too big a subscriber base to compute
an AV with reasonable latency each time a user needs to be authenticated. Such
a big subscriber base is plausible when the HN supports smart factories.
In PEFMA, the UE, SN, and HN each have their own pairs of public/private
keys. Compromising these keys have different levels of security and privacy im-
pacts. Different revocation strategies are needed depending on the impacts of
compromising a key. For example, when the key of an SN is compromised, re-
voking the key does not help because the sender, i.e., the UE, cannot look up the
revocation list before accepting the key. Therefore, the ETs used for SNs need to
be kept short-lived. In this way, an attacker who possesses the private key of the
SN can mount an attack only as long as the ET is not expired. In Subsections
4.4.1 and 4.5.2 of Paper I, we have discussed the key revocation and impact of
compromised/lost keys in greater detail.
5.3.2 Comparative Evaluation
In Paper I, we have discussed principles of eight candidate solutions to defend
against IMSI catchers. We have presented a comparative analysis between these
candidate solutions based on thirteen measuring criteria (see Table 5.1). This
table is copied from Table 1 of Paper I. Scores given to candidate solutions on
particular measuring criteria are qualitatively estimated based on 3GPP require-
ments and established views of the underlying cryptographic techniques of the
candidate solutions.
In Paper I, we have not explicitly discussed the essence of the measuring
criteria. The scores given to candidate solutions were based on the state-of-the-
art in 2017. The justifications of the given scores are not explicitly articulated in
Paper I. In 2018, a re-interpretation of the Lawful Interception (LI) requirement
caused some changes in the given scores, as discussed by Khan et al. [111].
So, towards a clearer understanding of the comparative analysis as of 2017, we
make the discussion explicit in the following. The scores are marked by (i)
“++” meaning very good, (ii) “+” meaning good, and (iii) “−” meaning not
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desirable but acceptable. Every solution is at least acceptable for every criterion.
Therefore, we do not use the mark “−−” at all.
Immunity to Active IMSI Catcher (AIC)
This measuring criterion is about how effective a solution is in fixing the vul-
nerability in the identification procedure. It is also the most important criterion
because the vulnerability in the identification procedure is the most easily ex-
ploitable vulnerability by an active IMSI catcher, and the whole effort is towards
defeating the active IMSI catchers. All the eight candidate solutions fix the
vulnerability in the identification procedure, i.e., an active IMSI catcher cannot
trick the UE to reveal its IMSI by impersonating a legitimate SN and sending
“identity request”. Hence, none of the solutions is given the score “−”.
Concealing Home Network Identity (hnid)
This measuring criterion is about whether the solutions can conceal the MCC and
MNC parts of the SUPI or not. The SN needs to know MCC and MNC parts of
the IMSI of a user so that it can route identification-related messages to the right
HN [111]. To ensure that the SN can learn this information correctly, most of the
eight candidate solutions require sending MCC and MNC in plaintext with the
exception of Version 1 of the certificate-based solution and JPL. Consequently,
these two solutions are given the score “+” and the rest are given “−”.
Effort Needed for Lawful Interception
This measuring criterion is about how much effort is required in the SN and HN to
fulfil the requirements related to Lawful Interception (LI). The most relevant LI
requirement is that the SN should be able to identify a user with the IMSI/SUPI
without relying on the HN. In the root-key-based solution and JPL, the SN has
to rely on the HN to identify a user with the IMSI – HN has to send the IMSI to
the SN. This is because these two schemes encrypt the MSIN part of the IMSI
using a key such that only the HN can decrypt the ciphertext.
In the 5G standards, the SN uses SUPI, which is sent by the HN, to compute
the key KAMF (see Subsection 4.2.2). The UE has to compute the key KAMF in
the same way as the SN to get services from the SN. Indeed, otherwise, the UE
and SN would have different KAMF, and therefore, the Security Mode Command
Procedures (SMC) will fail. The failure of SMC procedures would imply the
termination of the communication establishment attempt. Therefore, if the SMC
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procedures succeed, the SN can be sure that the HN has sent the same SUPI as
the UE is using, i.e., the SN does not need to simply trust that the HN would
not lie about the SUPI.
In all the other public-key-based solutions, the SN does not need the HN’s
assistance for resolving the IMSI. This is because the SN itself can decrypt the
encrypted MSIN. In Paper I, we assumed that a pseudonym would be considered
as a valid IMSI for the purposes of LI since it looks like an IMSI.3 In light of the
above discussion, the root-key-based solution and JPL are given the score “−”
and the rest are given the score “+”.
Mutual Authentication Without Contacting the HN Each Time
This measuring criterion is about whether it is possible to run mutual authentica-
tion between the UE and the SN without the assistance of the HN each time the
authentication runs. Such a mutual authentication may be useful in certain use
cases in which obtaining AV from the HN is expensive. The pseudonym-based
solution, root-key-based solution, and IBE-based protocol PEMMA cannot be
used for such mutual authentication. This is because, in these cases, the SN
cannot resolve the IMSI without consulting with the HN. Therefore these three
solutions are given the score “−”.
In contrast, in other solutions, once the right keys are provisioned to the UE
and SN, a mutual authentication as discussed above can be achieved. Therefore,
these solutions are given the score “+”.
Signalling Overhead
This measuring criterion is about how much signalling between the UE and the
network is required by the solutions. The pseudonym-based solution does not
use public-key encryption. The use of only symmetric key encryption produces
shorter ciphertext, which keeps the signalling overhead significantly low. So, the
score given to the pseudonym-based solution is “++”.
Certificate-based solutions require an extra round trip between the UE and
the SN to exchange the certificate, which creates signalling overhead. Besides,
certificates can be quite long. So, the score given to all the three versions of
certificate-based solutions is “−”.
3Later, we no more considered that pseudonyms would substitute IMSI for the purposes of
LI. Therefore, the pseudonym-based solutions (Paper II and Paper III) too needed the HN’s
assistance to resolve the IMSI.
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Neither the root-key-based nor IBE-based solutions need to exchange cer-
tificates, which is a significant relief. However, these solutions produce en-
crypted IMSI, which is quite a lot longer than pseudonyms. So, compared to
the pseudonym-based solution, we give a lower score to the root-key-based solu-
tion, which is “+”.
Computational Overhead
This measuring criterion is about how much computation is required by the
solutions in the UE and the network. Pseudonym-based solutions require some
extra computation in the HN to generate the next pseudonyms of a user. Since
the computation is symmetric-key-based, the overhead is small. However, the
solution also requires other systems, e.g., the billing system, to maintain a history
of pseudonym-IMSI mapping. So, the score given is “+”.
Certificate-based solutions require verifying certificates and compute public-
key encryption and decryption. This creates additional computational overhead.
So, the score given to all the three versions of the certificate-based solutions is
“−”.
Both root-key and IBE-based solutions require public-key encryption and
decryption but do not require verifying certificates. So, the score given to them
is “+’.
Authentication Latency While Roaming
This measuring criterion is applicable when a user is roaming. The criterion is
about the network delay in authenticating the roaming user.
In the pseudonym-based solution, when the user is roaming, in order to resolve
the IMSI, the pseudonym has to travel all the way to the HN, which increases
latency. So we rate it with “−”.
Certificate-based solutions require an extra round trip between the UE and
SN to exchange and verify the certificates. These solutions compute public key
encryption and have messages of longer length. All these affect the latency. So
we rate the certificate-based solution with “−”.
In the root-key-based solution and in PEMMA, when the user is roaming,
in order to resolve the IMSI, the encrypted IMSI has to travel a relatively long
distance, i.e., up to the HN, which increases latency. So we evaluate it with
“−”. The solutions in JPL and PEFMA do not require any extra round trips or
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certificates. The encrypted IMSI does not need to travel up to the HN. So we
rate them with “+”.
Authentication Latency While at Home
This measuring criterion is about the network delay in authenticating a user while
the user is not roaming. The latency due to the distance between the SN and
HN disappears when the user is not roaming. Moreover, due to symmetric-key
operations, pseudonym-based solutions are relatively fast. Therefore, we rate the
pseudonym-based solution with “++”.
On the other hand, due to the added computational and communication
overhead in certificate-based solutions, we give them the score “−”. The rest
of the solutions are given a better score than the certificate-based solution and
worse than the pseudonym-based solution, i.e., “+”.
Required PKI Effort
This measuring criterion is about how much effort is needed in setting up and
maintaining a PKI. Except for Version 1 of the certificate-based solution, none
other needs a PKI. So, Version 1 of the certificate-based solution is given the
score “−”.
In the pseudonym-based solution, no public key is involved. Consequently, it
has no need for a PKI. Therefore, we give it the score “++”.
In other certificate-based solutions, only the HN can be a root CA. Therefore,
a full-scale PKI would not be needed because the HN itself can provide the
services (signing, revocation, etc.) expected from the PKI. Also, in the root-key-
based and IBE-based solutions, the HN is the root of trust. The public key of the
HN is provisioned to the UE. Therefore, a PKI is not needed. All these solutions
are given the score “+”.
Required Effort in Key Revocation
This measuring criterion is about how much effort is required by the network
and UE to ensure that an old or compromised key does not continue to be used.
The pseudonym-based solution is symmetric-key-based. So, it does not require
any key revocation. Therefore, we rate it with “++”.
In certificate-based solutions, to access the revocation list, a user has to con-
nect to an SN. It is difficult to design a feasible solution so that before connecting
to the SN, the UE can know whether the public key of the SN is revoked or not.
5.3 Defending against IMSI Catchers in 5G 67
On the other hand, in IBE-based solutions, revocation is inherently complicated
(as explained before in this chapter). One solution around the complication is
to use short-lived ET for the public keys of the SN. So we rate certificate-based
and IBE-based solutions with “−”.
In root-key-based solution, no revocation is required because there is only one
public key. However, if the corresponding private key is compromised, the UE
has to be re-provisioned with the new public key. So, we rate the root-key-based
solution with “+”.
Required Provisioning Effort
This measuring criterion is about how much effort in the HN is required by
the solutions to provision the UE and SNs with necessary information. In
the pseudonym-based solution, the UE needs to be provisioned with initial
pseudonyms. If pseudonyms get de-synchronised for some reason (discussed in
Paper II), the users may need to physically visit a shop of the HN to be re-
provisioned with fresh pseudonyms.
In the certificate-based solutions, the UE needs to be provisioned with a
root of trust, i.e., the public key and its certificate of a trusted entity. In these
solutions, also the SNs need to be provisioned with the certificates of their public
keys.
So, we give both the pseudonym-based and certificate-based solutions the
same score: “+”. However, in Version 3 of certificate-based solutions, UEs need
to be additionally provisioned with the certificates of all the trusted SNs. Due
to this additional need, Version 3 is given the score “−”.
In the root-key-based solution, the UE needs to be provisioned with the public
key of the HN. In IBE-based solutions, both the UE and SN need to be provi-
sioned with their respective public/private key pairs and the public key of the
HN. However, these solutions do not require to provision the UE with the public
keys of the SN. So, they are given the score “+”.
Opportunity of Using Existing Gear
This measuring criterion is about the needs for additional infrastructure on top of
the existing. Six of the eight solutions do not need any additional gears. Version
1 of certificate-based solutions and JPL need additional gears. Therefore we rate
Version 1 and JPL with “−”, and the rest of the solutions with “+”.
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Maturity of the Underlying Cryptographic Techniques
This measuring criterion is about the maturity of the cryptographic techniques
used in a solution. We look at the maturity of the cryptographic concepts and
the success stories of using those concepts in solving real-life problems.
Use of pseudonyms (assigned by the HN) for privacy purposes was not yet a
matured technology. So we rate the pseudonym-based solution with “−”.
Certificate-based public-key encryption technology is widespread and ma-
tured. Use of root-key can be viewed as a special case of a certificate-based
public-key cryptosystem. So, we rate both certificate-based and root-key-based
solutions with “+”.
However, Version 3 of the certificate-based solution is an unusual case of
certificate-based solutions and not yet studied carefully. Therefore, the score
given to it is“−”.
Use of IBE is not yet widespread. So we rate the IBE-based solutions too
with “−”.
Discussion
If concealing MCC and MNC is essential, then the only applicable solution is
Version 1 of the certificate-based solution, i.e., the solution with a full-scale PKI.
If revealing MCC and MNC is found to be acceptable in benefit-cost analysis,
then the choice of the solution depends on the importance of obtaining mutual
authentication between the UE and SN without the assistance of the HN. If such
mutual authentication is conceived to be necessary, then PEFMA is the most
suitable candidate. One potential use case of such necessity is the smart factory
where numerous devices are connected to the network. If such mutual authenti-
cation is not necessary, the root-key-based or the pseudonym-based solution will
suffice.
Please note that while roaming, if a user moves its USIM from one ME to
another, then the user may not be able to use PEFMA in the new ME. This is
because the PEFMA-related keys are provisioned to the ME, not to the USIM.
If the USIM is moved to another ME, then the new ME either would not work at
all or would lose protection against IMSI catchers that exploit the vulnerability
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in the identification procedure.4 A future avenue of research would be to solve
this usability issue.
The SUCI-based solution adopted by 3GPP, as discussed above, is in principle
the same as the root-key-based solution. A pseudonym-based solution was not
adopted by 3GPP, perhaps because of the additional effort needed to maintain
the mapping between pseudonyms and IMSI at the HN.
5.4 Fixing Vulnerability in the Identification Proce-
dures of 3G and LTE
This section is based on Paper II. One main contribution of this paper is showing
that a pseudonym synchronisation issue [103] of the proposed pseudonym-based
solutions [4, 60, 62, 103] can be exploited by attackers to cause fatal harm to
an HN on a large scale. The other main contribution is providing a solution to
mitigate the weakness. Our solution fixes the vulnerability in the identification
procedures of 3G and LTE. The basic principle of our solution could be used to
fix the vulnerability in 5G, had the vulnerability not already been fixed in 5G.
Pseudonym-based solutions to defeat IMSI catchers have been published in
the recent past [4, 60, 62, 103]. The most promising aspect of these solu-
tions is that they are transparent to the SN. Therefore, if an HN implements a
pseudonym-based solution, then its users already can go roaming to an SN that
has not yet implemented the solution, and the users remain protected against
IMSI catchers while roaming.
The basic idea of a pseudonym-based solution is to use frequently-changing
temporary identities called pseudonyms that look like IMSI, instead of using
actual IMSI. A pseudonym looks like an IMSI when the format of the IMSI
is preserved in the pseudonym. More specifically, a pseudonym looks like an
IMSI when (i) the MCC and MNC parts of the IMSI remain unchanged (ii) the
length and alphabet of the MSIN part remain unchanged. Khan et al. [111] has
explained that the MCC and MNC need to remain fixed in order to be able to
route the IMSI to the correct HN.
4If the new ME is PEFMA aware and provisioned with the public key of an HN that is
different from the HN of the USIM, then the authentication would not succeed. If the new ME
is not PEFMA aware, then it may send IMSI in plaintext to the SN and consequently loses
protection against IMSI catchers.
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5.4.1 How Pseudonyms Work
In pseudonym-based solutions [4, 60, 62, 103], the UE would never send the IMSI
in response to the identity request. Instead, the UE would send a pseudonym.
Pseudonyms are different from TMSI or (5G) GUTI. The most important differ-
ence is that pseudonyms are assigned to a UE by the HN, but TMSI and (5G)
GUTI are assigned by the SN. Also, pseudonyms change less frequently than
TMSI and (5G) GUTI. A UE is provisioned with pseudonyms in the beginning.
The UE uses these pseudonyms in response to the very first “identity request”
that it receives from an SN. The SN forwards the pseudonym (that the UE sent)
to the HN.
New pseudonyms that the UE uses in response to the successive identity re-
quests can be allocated in different ways. For example, the UE could generate
new pseudonyms based on rules previously provisioned to the UE by the HN. Al-
ternatively, the UE and HN could generate identical pseudonyms independently
as a bi-product of running AKAs, for example, by hashing the IMSI and a salt
using the shared permanent key. The third example is that the HN sends a new
pseudonym (confidentiality and integrity protected) to the UE (via the SN) by
piggybacking extra information on the existing messages of the AKA protocol.
In our solutions, we have adapted this last example, which we explain more in
the following.
Using cryptographic techniques, the HN embeds a new pseudonym into the
random challenge RAND in the process of preparing an authentication vector
AV. In 3GPP standards, the length of the RAND is 128 bits. Embedding of
pseudonyms in RAND is done in such a way that the entropy of RAND does not
decrease too much. When the AV arrives, the UE first verifies the authenticity
of the AV. If the verification result is positive, i.e., the AV is authentic, then the
UE can perform the inverse cryptographic operation that the HN used to embed
a pseudonym into the RAND. Thus the UE can extract the pseudonym. The
next time, the UE uses the new pseudonym in response to an “identity request”.
Once the UE has received a new pseudonym, an IMSI catcher will get a dif-
ferent response to the subsequent “identity request”. Therefore, the UE appears
as a new UE to the IMSI catcher, causing the IMSI catching attack to fail. At
the end of Section 4 of Paper III, we have presented a summary of different
alternative mechanisms of allocating pseudonyms.
One challenge of using a pseudonym-based solution is to inform the SN the
true IMSI of the subscriber that is linked to the used pseudonym. The need for
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informing the SN about the true IMSI of a user stems from a Lawful Interception
(LI) requirement as discussed in Section 2.5.
Another complexity of the solution is that the pseudonym space is finite, and
due to scalability reasons, the HN has to reuse pseudonyms. Therefore, both the
UE and HN have to release old pseudonyms when new pseudonyms are assigned.
The releasing of old pseudonyms has to be synchronised between the UE and
the HN. Otherwise, it may happen that the HN has released a pseudonym from
one user and assigned it to another user when the first user continues to use the
pseudonym. In that situation, when the first user uses the pseudonym, the HN
may mistake the first user for the second user.
If the HN incorrectly recognises every pseudonym that a UE sends, then UE
cannot succeed in authenticating itself. Therefore, the UE remains locked out of
the network. It is crucial to ensure that an attacker cannot trick the HN into the
following de-synchronised state: the HN retains a set of pseudonyms for one of
its subscribers that has no common elements with the set of the pseudonyms that
the subscriber’s UE has retained. For many pseudonym-based solutions existing
in the literature [4, 60, 62], it is possible for a malicious UE to trick the HN into
the de-synchronised state, as explained by Khan and Mitchell [103] and Paper II.
For billing purposes, the HN has to maintain a history of pseudonyms assigned
to an IMSI over different time periods. Such maintenance of pseudonym history
may also be dictated by the data retention policy of the overseeing jurisdiction.
5.4.2 Pseudonym De-synchronisation and a DDoS Attack
In 2017, Khan and Mitchell [103] first identified a weakness in the pseudonym-
based solutions that had been published until then. The weakness can be ex-
ploited by a malicious UE just by trying to connect to an SN. All that the mali-
cious UE has to do is send pseudonyms to an SN in an attempt to connect. We
have explained the attack in Section 4 of Paper II. The attack succeeds mostly
due to the fact that the HN releases an old pseudonym from one of its users
before getting the confirmation that the user has received the new pseudonym.
In Paper II, we have argued that the attack can be converted into a DDoS
attack. We have characterised the attack using a probabilistic argument (sup-
ported by simulation) and showed that a DDoS attack requiring only a modest
amount of effort could do significant harm to an HN. For example, by sending
three fake pseudonyms an hour from each bot, a botnet of one million bots can
push out (of the network) approximately two per cent of the users of a large mo-
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bile operator (ten million subscribers), creating a massive strain on the customer
service points of the operator.
Khan and Mitchell [103] proposed a solution by leveraging the Location Up-
date (LU) message. The LU message is sent by an SN to the HN when a UE
first connects to the SN (see Subsection 4.1.2). We name the solution “KM17
scheme”. The solution uses six temporary identities (three pseudonyms and
three recovery identities) at the HN. The solution is vulnerable to a pseudonym
de-synchronisation attack by a malicious or faulty SN. The solution provides a
re-synchronisation procedure. In case pseudonyms get de-synchronised due to an
attack by a malicious or faulty SN, the re-synchronisation procedure can be used
to get the pseudonyms synchronised.
In Section 3.2 of Paper II, we have argued that the recovery technique itself is
vulnerable to IMSI catchers. In the same section we have explained, we also have
explained that in the KM17 scheme, that a user has to use one pseudonym at
least twice before it can receive a new pseudonym from the HN. In our solution,
we fix these issues.
5.4.3 Our Solution
We propose a solution in Section 5 of Paper II that is simpler than the KM17
scheme. Our solution also leverages the LU message. Unlike the KM17 scheme,
our solution does not include a re-synchronisation procedure, therefore, does not
add any additional vulnerability. Also, in our solution, a user does not need to
use a pseudonym more than once to receive a new pseudonym.
We have put a particular focus on analysing the synchronisation issue of
pseudonyms. We have classified the states of pseudonyms in the HN and the UE.
Then we have identified how one state of pseudonyms transforms into another
state of pseudonyms. Based on these observations, we have sketched a state-
diagram of the pseudonym states. Using the state diagram, we argue that the
pseudonym de-synchronisation can not happen unless the SN sends wrong LU
messages (see Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of Paper II). Thus, like the KM17 scheme,
our solution remains vulnerable to the pseudonym de-synchronisation attack by
a malicious or faulty SN.
However, unlike the KM17 scheme, our solution does not include any re-
synchronisation procedure. Instead, we argue in Section 6.2 of Paper II that a
malicious SN can be very quickly identified and be blocked from communicating
with the HN before it can cause any serious damages to the HN and that the
incentive to mount such an attack is not sufficient.
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In Section 6.2 of Paper II, we have also discussed other properties of our
solution. For example, we have presented a list of unusual but possible situations
and discussed the behaviour of our solution in those situations. The discussion
also includes how the solution is compatible with the legacy SNs and is immune
to replay attacks (to de-synchronise pseudonyms) by malicious SNs. We also have
discussed the implication of using pseudonyms in lawful interception processes
in the HN. The HN would need to maintain a history of pseudonyms used by a
particular user.
5.4.4 Discussion
In Paper II, we have presented an almost SN-transparent (small patching in the
SN is required for LI purposes) solution to fix the vulnerability in the iden-
tification procedure. The solution is the first of its kind that is immune to
pseudonym de-synchronisation, except that a malicious SN can cause pseudonym
de-synchronisation by sending fake LU messages. However, currently, a malicious
SN can mount other attacks (perhaps more fatal) by sending fake LU messages.
Thus, 3G and LTE networks already put trust in SNs that they would not send
fake LU messages. In that line of argument, it is acceptable that the pseudonym-
based solution is mildly vulnerable to malicious SNs.
5.5 Defeating Downgrade Attack by IMSI Catchers
Against 5G Users
This section is based on Paper III. The main contribution of Paper III is
combining the SUCI-based 5G mechanism of defeating IMSI catchers with the
pseudonym-based mechanism (as presented in Paper II) of defeating them in
LTE networks. The outcome is a hybrid solution that defeats IMSI catchers
that attack a 5G user by downgrading to the LTE network and exploiting the
vulnerability in the identification procedure of the LTE network. In Paper III,
we discuss the hybridisation process of 5G AKA and LTE AKA. Nevertheless,
similar hybridisation can be done using 5G AKA and UMTS AKA, too.
The hybrid solution, which is presented in Paper III, makes two improvements
in the pseudonym-based solution, which is presented in Paper II. First, a mali-
cious SN cannot attack anymore by sending fake LU messages to de-synchronise
pseudonyms between a UE and the HN. However, pseudonyms may still go de-
synchronised due to unlikely errors, e.g., corrupted memory, at the UE or HN
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end. The second improvement is that re-sychnronisation of pseudonyms happens
automatically when the UE connects to a 5G SN.
Use of pseudonyms for a 5G user has an additional issue. A 5G UE may con-
nect to multiple SNs simultaneously, causing the UE to use different pseudonyms
to connect to different SNs. Hence, it is a challenge for the HN to know when
it can disassociate a pseudonym from a current user and reallocate to a new
user. In our solution, we solve this challenge by embedding pseudonym-related
information in the SUCI.
5.5.1 Solution
Our solution uses a subscriber-specific strictly monotonically increasing counter
d associated with a pseudonym, which is maintained by the HN (see Section 4 of
Paper III). Along with a pseudonym, the HN also sends the associated counter
to the UE using a similar technique as in Paper II. The UE may receive a new
pseudonym by running the LTE AKA or 5G AKA. The UE and HN also maintain
sets of pseudonyms in addition to those in Paper II. The UE deletes pseudonyms
from its set of pseudonyms based on the policy provided by the HN that could
utilise, e.g., the pseudonym lifetime or maximum size of the set.
The HN disassociates a pseudonym from a user only if it receives sufficient
information about the in-use pseudonyms from the right UE. The required in-
formation about pseudonyms in the UE, along with integrity protection, is pig-
gybacked on the SUCI. The UE embeds the counter of the newest and oldest
in-use pseudonyms into the SUCI, see Section 4.2 and Algorithm 4 in Paper III.
The HN does not disassociate a pseudonym from a user in any other situations.
Thus, the LU messages from LTE networks do not have any impact on dis-
associating a pseudonym and in turn, do not have any impact on pseudonym
de-synchronisation.
The above discussion implies that the set of pseudonyms for a user in the HN
may reduce in size only when the user sends a SUCI. Thus, if a user keeps using
LTE networks without connecting to 5G, the set of pseudonyms keeps growing
in size. Such an unrestricted growth of the set would shrink the number of free
pseudonyms and would threaten the exhaustion of all the free pseudonyms. The
state where there are no free pseudonyms would cause the system not to provide
the desired privacy any more. In Section 4 of Paper III, we have discussed a
mechanism based on a cap on the size of the sets of pseudonyms in the HN. This
mechanism prevents sets of pseudonyms from growing beyond an upper limit,
e.g., 100 pseudonyms in one set. In the paper, we present an argument that
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shows that the HN can allow the average size of the sets of pseudonyms to be as
low as a dozen.
Pseudonym de-synchronisation happens when the UE has not a single
pseudonym at its disposal that is associated with the UE’s IMSI at the HN. We
have defined de-synchronisation more formally in Section 5.1 of Paper III. We
also have argued that de-synchronisation of pseudonyms cannot happen as long
as the HN and UE function correctly. However, in an unlikely error case, if the
UE and HN end up in de-synchronised states of pseudonyms, re-synchronisation
can be done by simply sending a SUCI to a 5G SN and participating in the
subsequent 5G AKA protocol.
Based on the information about pseudonyms piggybacked on the SUCI, the
HN can know if de-synchronisation has happened. If yes, the HN sends a signal
to the UE by piggybacking on the RAND. Upon receiving the signal, the UE
deletes all the existing pseudonyms and accepts the new pseudonym extracted
from the RAND. The re-synchronisation process is explained in Section 5.1 of
Paper III.
Our solution would need patching in the LTE SNs to support an LI require-
ment. The LI requirement is that the SNs need to be able to recognise a user
using the IMSI of the user without relying on another network or jurisdiction,
for example, the HN. In Section 5.2 of Paper III, we have outlined the design of
the required patch.
A pseudonym would be reused for different users. The billing systems of
the mobile operators would have to implement a pseudonym-to-IMSI mapping
before charging a subscriber. The reuse of pseudonyms makes it challenging to
implement a pseudonym-to-IMSI mapping that can be efficiently used by the
billing system.
5.5.2 Discussion
In Paper III, we have presented an almost SN-transparent (small patching needed
in the SN for LI purposes) solution that (i) protects a downgrade attack on the
identity privacy of a 5G user, and (ii) unlike other pseudonym-based solutions,
is immune to the pseudonym de-synchronisation attack by a malicious/faulty
SN. If pseudonym de-synchronisation happens due to some error, e.g., corrupted
memory, at the UE or the HN end, re-synchronisation happens automatically the
next time the UE connects to a 5G SN.
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Chapter 6
Privacy Preserving AKMA
This chapter is based on Paper IV that discusses AKMA— an authentication and
key management system for applications. Specifications for the system AKMA
have been published in 3GPP Release 16 in July 2020. One of the two main
contributions of the paper is an analysis of AKMA requirements with a particular
focus on finding new privacy requirements. The other main contribution is the
development of a privacy mode of AKMA that can co-exist with a normal mode.
In AKMA, authentication of a user to an “application service provider”, also
known as AKMA Application Function (AApF) in the context of AKMA,1 would
be based upon the user’s 3GPP credentials. For example, a gambling service
provider can take the role of the AApF. The user’s HN takes the role of the
authentication server. The endpoint of the AKMA protocol in the HN is called
AKMA Authentication Function (AAuF). The application providers would not
require storing authentication relation data. The users would not need to re-
member passwords for different applications, as long as the user uses the mobile
phone to connect.
Similar systems also exist in the older generations of mobile networks. For
example, 3GPP published the Generic Bootstrap Architecture (GBA) in Release-
6 in 2004, and Battery Efficient Security for Very Low Throughput Machine Type
Communication Devices (BEST) in Release-15 in 2017. So, the concept of AKMA
is not new but has evolved from GBA and BEST. Naturally, in 3GPP, the study
on AKMA [69] is influenced by the standards of GBA and BEST in identifying
1The entity has different names in different 3GPP contexts, e.g., Network Application Func-
tion (NAF) or Enterprise Application Server (EAS).
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the requirements that AKMA should fulfil and developing solutions to meet those
requirements.
In Paper IV, we compare these three systems and look into their similarities
and differences more closely. Such an investigation produces a birds-eye view of
the envisioned AKMA. The birds-eye view gives more leverage in revealing re-
quirements that might have been overlooked in the study of AKMA and provides
a more precise objective for the solution design activities.
The comparative requirement analysis of GBA, BEST, and AKMA is a non-
trivial task. There is no single document that enlists the requirements that GBA
or BEST fulfils. This is because the requirement analysis is not done upfront. Re-
quirements were made in parallel with developing the solutions. However, during
our analysis in Paper IV, it was possible to sift out the essential characteristics
of GBA and BEST by studying their specifications [67, 68]. We consider these
characteristics to be the requirements of the systems. For AKMA, we study the
potential security requirements from the AKMA study document [69].
The details of requirement analysis can be found in Paper IV. In this chapter,
we do not represent the requirement analysis in detail. Instead, we only present
a summary of the comparison.
6.1 Summary of AKMA Requirement Analysis
We have identified 22 different requirements. Paper IV summarises all these re-
quirements in Table 1 and explains them in Section 3. Most of these requirements
are common in all three systems: GBA, BEST, and AKMA. Five of the require-
ments are AKMA requirements, but they are not GBA or BEST requirements.
Three of the requirements are either GBA or BEST requirements, but they are
not yet identified as AKMA requirements (see Requirements 12, 13, and 14 in
Table 1 of Paper IV). We anticipate the 3GPP community will discuss these
requirements in the future.
We propose to put less trust in the HN than the 3GPP community has put
in the AKMA study [69]. This is partly because of the rising trend of insider
attacks [5–7]. A recent GSMA Intelligence report [117] has presented the result
of a survey on consumers’ concerns about privacy. The survey has found that
despite the growing device sales, consumers are seriously concerned about privacy
and the report also mentions that regulators are still working on devising new
data regulation. The report suggests that beyond complying with regulation,
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tech companies that pre-emptively adopt the strictest measures for data privacy
will benefit from a competitive advantage by meeting consumer expectations.
As a consequence of putting less trust in the HN, we have identified two
privacy requirements which are not fulfilled by GBA or BEST (see Requirements
21 and 22 in Table 1 of Paper IV). We believe these two privacy requirements are
worth considering for AKMA. The first one is “Privacy of usage history” and the
second one is “Identity unlinkability”. Paper IV discusses these two requirements
in Section 3.1.
“Privacy of usage history” says that the AAuF, in the HN, should not know
the name of the AApFs, i.e., the service providers, that a user connects to. Such a
privacy requirement may be desired by a user, especially when the AApF provides
privacy-sensitive services, e.g., a gambling or dating service.
“Identity unlinkability” says, two SPUIDs2 (that may belong to the same or
different AApF) should not be linkable by one or more AApFs. In simple words,
given two of its users, an AApF cannot tell if they belong to a single mobile
phone user. Also, given two users from two AApFs, the AApFs (even if they
collude) cannot tell if those two users belong to a single mobile phone user. For
example, if a mobile phone user uses a dating service using the SPUID romeo
and a gambling service using the SPUID smeagol then the dating service and the
gambling service (even when colluding) should not be able to figure out that the
SPUIDs romeo and smeagol belong to the same mobile phone user.
Please note that the aforementioned privacy requirements are not new for
delegated authentication systems. They have also been identified and discussed
in the context OpenID and OpenID Connect [118, 119].
6.2 AKMA Solution
Section 4 of Paper IV presents our solution in detail. Our solution has two
modes: (i) normal mode and (ii) privacy mode. The normal mode does not fulfil
the privacy requirements, i.e., Requirements 21 and 22 in Table 1 of Paper IV.
The privacy mode fulfils these privacy requirements and as many of the other
requirements as possible. Our solution has two separate procedures: (i) AKMA
bootstrapping and (ii) AKMA bootstrap usage. In both the normal and privacy
modes, the AKMA bootstrapping procedure is the same. However, the “AKMA
bootstrap usage” procedures are different in different modes. The UE chooses
2A SPUID is a user identity that is used by a user to identify himself to a specific service
provider. SPUID is defined in Subsection 2.2.4
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which mode it wants to use in the first message of the AKMA bootstrap usage
procedure.
A UE first runs the AKMA bootstrapping procedure (see Figure 6 of
Paper IV) and then the AKMA bootstrap usage procedure. The AKMA boot-
strapping procedure is run between the UE and the AAuF. The bootstrapping
procedure is designed based on the 5G AKA protocol. As a result of the boot-
strapping procedure, the UE and the HN establish a key called KAKMA. The HN
also sends a temporary identity TID and a key lifetime to the UE. The UE uses
the TID later when it runs an AKMA bootstrap usage procedure.
In the normal-mode AKMA bootstrap usage procedure (see Figure 7 of
Paper IV), the UE sends the TID and the AAuF identity to the AApF so that the
AApF can obtain a symmetric key (derived from KAKMA) from the AAuF. Dur-
ing the normal-mode AKMA bootstrap usage procedure, if the AApF and AAuF
communicate with each other, then the AAuF is able to mount a “correlation at-
tack” (see Section 4.3 of Paper IV) against the “privacy of usage history”. In the
“correlation attack”, the AAuF correlates the time of “AKMA bootstrapping”
with the time of the “AKMA bootstrap usage” procedure. In our normal-mode
“AKMA bootstrap usage” procedure (also in all the proposed solutions in the
AKMA study [69]), the AApF and AAuF communicate with each other. There-
fore, the normal-mode remains vulnerable to the “correlation attack”.
6.2.1 Privacy-mode AKMA Bootstrap Usage
Our privacy-mode “AKMA bootstrap usage” procedure is designed in a way
such that the AApF and AAuF do not communicate (see Figure 8 of Paper IV)
directly. The AApF, with the assistance of the UE directly and AAuF indirectly,
computes a one-way function that takes two secret constant inputs a, and b that
are known only by the AAuF and the UE respectively. No one else but the
AAuF knows a and no one else but the UE knows b. All the parties participate
in a series of computations, initiated by the AApF who first generates a random
number. In sequence, the UE and the AAuF transform the random number using
secrets b and a with the means of one-way cryptographic functions. The result
is eventually delivered back to the AApF by the UE. On the result, the AApF
performs a cryptographic inverse operation related to the initial random number
that the AApF chose. As an outcome of the inverse operation, the AApF obtains
a value which is the output of a one-way function that takes inputs a, and b, i.e.,
secrets unknown to AApF but known only to the AAuF and UE respectively.
We make some assumptions in our solution design:
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1. the UE and AApF establish a TLS connection before running AKMA, based
on a certificate provided by the AApF,
2. the AAuF has a public/private key pair and the AApF can somehow au-
thenticate the public key of the AAuF,
3. the UE has a secret key that no one else (not even the AAuF or any other
module in the HN) knows, and
4. the AAuF has a user-specific secret key that no one else (not even the UE)
knows.
The UE first establishes a TLS connection with the AApF. As part of this
procedure, the UE authenticates the AApF. The UE chooses its own SPUID and
sends it to the AApF over the TLS connection. However, in other connection
attempts that happen in future with the same SPUID, the AApF needs to au-
thenticate the SPUID. To that end, the AApF sends a random challenge gm to
the UE, where g is a generator of a group of prime order, and m is a randomly
chosen integer. No one but the AApF can know m due to the hardness of discrete
logarithm problem.
The UE generates the non-ephemeral key b, which is also discussed earlier
in this section, based on the SPUID, AApF id, and the secret key that no one
else but the UE knows. The UE blinds the random challenge gm using this
non-ephemeral key b by computing (gm)b and forwards it to the AAuF. The
forwarding of gmb is integrity and confidentiality protected using key KAKMAae,
which is generated during the “AKMA bootstrapping” procedure.
The AAuF generates the non-ephemeral key a based on the SUPI and the
secret key that no one else but the AAuF knows. The AAuF blinds gmb, which it
received from the UE, using the non-ephemeral key a by computing (gmb)a. The
AAuF then signs gmba using its private key and forwards gmba and the signature
to the UE. This forwarding is also confidentiality and integrity protected. The
UE extracts gmba and the signature by decrypting the message received from the
AAuF. Then, the UE forwards gmba and the signature to the AApF. The AApF
verifies the signature and computes (gmba)m
−1
= gab.
If the SPUID appeared for the first time, the AApF stores (SPUID,WSPUID =
gab) in its database and allows the SPUID to connect. However, if the SPUID is
already present in the database, then the AApF compares gab with WSPUID.
Amid above computations, optionally, the UE and AApF also perform an
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange. At the end of the AKMA bootstrap us-
age procedure, the UE and the AApF possess a shared secret key. See Steps 5.1,
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5.2, 7.5, and 11.6 in Figure 8 of Paper IV. Please note that the TLS handshake
protocol itself facilitates an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange [120, 121].
Therefore, while establishing a TLS connection, the UE and AApF can exchange
a secret key using TLS’s native ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange mecha-
nism. In this Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the UE’s contribution would not be
signed because the UE does not have a public/private key pair. In contrast, in
the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange of the AKMA bootstrap usage proce-
dure, the UE’s contribution is signed by the public key of the AAuF. The secret
key established by the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange of the AKMA
bootstrap usage procedure can be useful, for example, when the TLS connection
expires and cannot be re-established for some reasons.
6.2.2 Security and Privacy analysis of AKMA Bootstrap Usage
Procedure
In a nutshell, in the privacy-mode AKMA bootstrap usage procedure, the AApF
challenges a UE with a random number of the form gm
′
. The UE computes a
response to the challenge with the assistance of the AAuF. Let us assume that
in response to the AApF’s random challenge gm
′
, the UE returns a number of
the form gα, for some unknown α, to the AApF. The AApF computes (gα)m
′−1
.
If the SPUID that the UE used was not seen before by the AApF, then the
AApF considers (gα)m
′−1
equal to gab and stores gab. If the SPUID that the UE
used was seen before, then the AApF compares (gα)m
′−1
with the stored gab.
If the AApF’s computation (gα)m
′−1




In AKMA, the secret b is chosen and kept protected by the UE so that no one
else can know b. Hence, the party that knows b can be considered to be the
authentic UE. Secret a is chosen and kept protected by the AAuF so that no
one else can know a. Hence, the party that knows a can be considered to be the
authentic AAuF.
Claim: When challenged with gm
′
, a UE would be able to return gα = gm
′ba
to the AApF if and only if the UE had access to parties that knew b and a.
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We present a proof of the authentication-related security claim in this thesis.
To prove the claim, we provide a reduction from a variant of the Diffie-Hellman
problem known as the Delayed-Target Diffie-Hellman problem (DTDHP) [13,
122].
DTDHP
Freeman [122] has first defined DTDHP though he called it One-More Compu-
tational Diffie Hellman Problem. Koblitz and Menezes [123] called the problem
“Delayed Target” One-More Diffie-Hellman Problem (DTDHP). In this thesis,
we simply call it Delayed Target Diffie-Hellman Problem (DTDHP). In the fol-
lowing, a definition of the DTDHP problem is presented. The DTDHP problem
can also be seen in the form of the DTDHP Game presented in Figure 6.1.
Definition of DTDHP: Let G be a group of prime order. The solver is given
X ∈ G, and a one-sided Diffie-Hellman oracle. The oracle works as follows: given
an element Y ∈ G, the oracle answers Z ∈ G such that Z = gxy where X = gx
and Y = gy. The solver must compute Z ′ = gxy′ with input X = gx, Y ′ = gy′
where Y
′
is a random group element that is given to the solver only after the
solver has made all the queries to the oracle.
Gamemaster
(computer)
Holds the secret key x
Solver
(mathematician)
Does not know x
(1) Set up the game: X = gx
(2) Query: Y = gy
(3) Response: Z = gxy
...
(4) Ready for solving challenge
(5) Challenge: Y ′ = gy
′
(6) Guess: Z′




Figure 6.1: DTDHP Game.
84 6 Privacy Preserving AKMA
Freeman [122] has presented an identification scheme and given its security
proof based on the assumption that DTDHP is hard. Koblitz and Menezes [123]
further analyzed how to interpret the difficulty of DTDHP. We also assume that
DTDHP is hard and give proof of the authentication-related security claim.
Proof of the Authentication-Related Security Claim
It is straightforward to see that if the UE has access to parties that know b and
a, then the UE is able to return gα that is equal to gm
′ba. Conversely, we have
to show that if it is feasible for the participating UE to return gα that is equal
to gm
′ba, then the UE has access to parties that know b and a. Let us assume
that it is feasible for an adversary to return gα that is equal to gm
′ba, but the
adversary does not have access to parties that know b and a. In the following,
we prove that such an adversary could be used to the benefit of a mathematician
to win the DTDHP game. However, since winning the DTDHP game is hard,
it is also hard for the adversary to return gα that is equal to gm
′ba. Therefore,
our claim holds under the assumption that DTDHP is hard. In our proof, we
partition the set of all adversaries into three parts:
(1) Adversary does not know b but has access to somebody who
knows a: Let us consider a real-world AKMA adversary that does not
know b but knows gb and has access to somebody who knows a. The
adversary impersonates the UE that is the legitimate owner of a SPUID.
That is, the UE with secret b is the victim of the attack by the adversary.
To succeed in the attack, when the AApF sends a challenge Y = gm
′
, the
adversary has to return Z = gm
′ab.
We model such a real-world AKMA adversary as a Dolev-Yao adversary,
and we assume that the adversary does not have access to any side-channel
information such as time or power used for cryptographic computations by
AKMA elements. Based on the AKMA protocol, we design a simulated
AKMA game, called“AKMA Game I”. The game is presented in Figure
6.2. The game is designed in a way so that the adversary can win if the
adversary can be successful in the real-world AKMA attack as described
above. Soon, we will show that if the adversary can win AKMA Game I,
then by simulating AKMA Game I and using the adversary as an assistant,
a mathematician can win the DTDHP Game. Before showing so, we first
explain how AKMA Game I works.
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In the AKMA Game I (Figure 6.2), the Gamemaster simulates the
AKMA world. It knows all the secrets of the AKMA world and can play
the role of all the honest parties of AKMA. The Gamemaster gives the
adversary the secret a, but not b. The adversary is a Dolev-Yao adversary,
and therefore, can be seen as a mailman who is responsible for carrying
all the messages between different parties in the AKMA world. A message
carried by the adversary to a party in the AKMA world is called a query.
The response from a party in the AKMA world is first given to the adver-
sary. The adversary may modify a received response from a party and send
it as a query to another party in the AKMA world. Also, the adversary is
allowed to forge and send new queries. In Figure 6.2, in Step 2 (and respec-
tively in Step 5), these queries and responses are presented in a simplified
manner using a single double-headed arrow between the Gamemaster and
the adversary.
We further explain the queries and responses in AKMA Game I using a
few examples. The adversary could consider the Gamemaster to be the
AApF and try to connect to the AApF using a SPUID. To do this, the
adversary would have to forge and send an AKMAmessage as a query to the
Gamemaster. The AKMA message, which includes the SPUID, is described
in Step 2 of Figure 8 in Paper IV. The Gamemaster simulates AApF and
sends an AKMA message as a response to the adversary. This AKMA
message is a random challenge gm (see Step 4 in Figure 8 of Paper IV).
Also, the adversary can forward the random challenge gm as a query to
the Gamemaster considering the Gamemaster to be the victim UE. The
Gamemaster would simulate the victim UE and would return an AKMA
message as a response to the adversary. Please see Step 6 in Figure 8
of Paper IV. This message includes gmb. Similarly, the adversary could
consider the Gamemaster to be the AAuF and send messages that the
AAuF can process and respond to.
In a nutshell, the adversary can freely interact with the Gamemaster by
sending and receiving AKMA messages as queries and responses. The
AKMA messages that the adversary sends as queries can be exactly the
same as received previously as responses from the Gamemaster or can be
forged. The queries are allowed to be repetitive and can happen in an
interleaved manner.
After the adversary has done enough interactions with the Gamemaster,
the adversary informs the Gamemaster that the adversary is ready to go
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for an attack against the victim UE. Then, the Gamemaster would act as an
AApF and sends an AKMA message to the adversary. The AKMA message
is Y ′ = gm′ for a randomly chosen m′. The message corresponds to Step 4
in Figure 8 of Paper IV. In AKMA Game I, we consider this message as a
challenge to the adversary. After this, the adversary and the Gamemaster
could do further interactions. However, at this point, the Gamemaster
would not play the role of the victim UE anymore. Then, the adversary
sends an AKMA message to the Gamemaster of the AKMA Game I. The
AKMA message corresponds to Step 10 of Figure 8 in Paper IV. This
message includes a response Z ′ to the challenge Y ′. The adversary wins
the AKMA Game I if Z ′ = gm′ab. Otherwise, the adversary loses the game.
UE is victim
Gamemaster
- Simulates the AKMA
world
- Knows b and a
and every other
secret in AKMA
- Can do whatever is
possible to do in
the AKMA world
Adversary
- Does not know b
- Target is to masquerade
as victim UE
(1) Set up the game: a, gb
(2) Freely chosen interactions with
the AKMA world
...
(3) ready to go for an attack
against the victim UE
(4) Challenge Y ′ = gm
′
(5) Freely chosen interactions with
the AKMA world, except the
Gamemaster does not play the
role of the victim UE
(6) Guess Z′
(7) WIN if Z′ = gm
′ab,
otherwise LOSE
Figure 6.2: AKMA Game I.
A solver mathematician can win the DTDHP game by simulating AKMA
Game I and taking help from the adversary, who can win the AKMA Game
I. The simulation is presented in Figure 6.3. In the simulation, the DTDHP
solver mathematician plays the role of the Gamemaster of AKMA game I
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without knowing b, which is the secret of the victim UE. In the simulation,
“Adversary Assistant I” plays the role of the adversary in AKMA Game I.
The Gamemaster of AKMA Game I performs the computations with input
b = x by leveraging the Gamemaster of the DTDHP game. Whenever the
Adversary Assistant I sends a query gm (Step 4 in Figure 8 of Paper IV),
which is meant for the victim UE, the Gamemaster of AKMA Game I
forwards the query to the Gamemaster of the DTDHP Game. The response
(gmx) of the Gamemaster in the DTDHP Game is included in an AKMA
message (Step 6 in Figure 8 of Paper IV) by the Gamemaster of AKMA
Game I and sent to the Adversary Assistant I. All the other queries that
the Adversary Assistant I sends are responded to by the Gamemaster of
AKMA Game I without the assistance of the Gamemaster of the DTDHP
Game.
In Step 6 of Figure 6.3, the Adversary Assistant I declares that it is ready to
go for an attack against the victim UE. In Step 7, the solver mathematician
in the DTDHP Game declares that it is ready to solve a challenge. In
Step 8, the Gamemaster of the DTDHP Game sends a challenge (gy
′
) to
the solver mathematician. In Step 9, the Gamemaster of AKMA Game I
forwards the same challenge to Adversary Assistant I. This step corresponds
to Step 4 in Figure 8 of Paper IV. To win AKMA Game I, in Step 11, the
Adversary Assistant I must return an AKMA message, which corresponds
to Step 10 of Figure 8 in Paper IV. The AKMA message must include
a response Z ′ = gy′ab. In Step 12, the solver mathematician forwards
(Z ′)a−1 as a response to the original challenge in the DTDHP Game. It is
straightforward to see that the Adversary Assistant I wins AKMA Game I
if and only if the solver mathematician wins the DTDHP Game.
Since DTDHP is hard, the DTDHP solver mathematician cannot win the
DTDHP game. Therefore, there cannot be any adversary who can win
the AKMA Game I. Consequently, no adversary can exist against the real
AKMA that does not know b and has access to somebody who knows a and
can return gm
′ab when challenged with gm
′
.
(2) Adversary does not know a but has access to somebody who
knows b: Let us consider a real-world AKMA adversary that does not know
a but knows gb and has access to somebody who knows b. The adversary
impersonates the AAuF, which means the AAuF is the victim. To succeed
in the attack, when the AApF sends a challenge Y = gm
′
, the adversary
has to return Z = gm
′ab.
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Similarly as before, we model such a real-world AKMA adversary as a
Dolev-Yao adversary, and we assume that the adversary does not have
access to any side-channel information. Based on the AKMA protocol, we
design a simulated AKMA game, called “AKMA Game II”. The game is
designed in a way so that the adversary can win if the adversary can be
successful in the real-world AKMA attack as mentioned above. Soon, we
will show that if the adversary can win AKMA Game II, then by simulating
AKMA Game II, a mathematician can win the DTDHP Game. AKMA
Game II is presented in Figure 6.4. AKMA Game II is similar to AKMA
Game I except that the adversary does not know a and knows b.
A solver mathematician can win the DTDHP game by simulating AKMA
Game II and taking help from the adversary, who can win AKMA Game
II. The simulation is presented in Figure 6.5. The simulation of AKMA
Game II is similar to the simulation of AKMA Game I. Nevertheless, for
better readability, we describe it fully and not just the difference to the
simulation of AKMA Game I.
In the simulation, the DTDHP solver mathematician plays the role of the
Gamemaster of AKMA game II without knowing a, which is the secret of
the victim AAuF. In the simulation, “Adversary Assistant II” plays the role
of the adversary in AKMA Game II. The Gamemaster of AKMA Game II
performs the computations with input a = x by leveraging the Gamemaster
of the DTDHP game. Whenever the Adversary Assistant II sends a query
that includes gmb (Step 6 in Figure 8 of Paper IV), which is meant for
the victim AAuF, the Gamemaster of AKMA Game II forwards the query
to the Gamemaster of the DTDHP Game. The response (gmbx) of the
Gamemaster in the DTDHP Game is included in an AKMA message (Step
8 in Figure 8 of Paper IV) by the Gamemaster of AKMA Game II and sent
to the Adversary Assistant II. All the other queries that the Adversary
Assistant II sends are responded to by the Gamemaster of AKMA Game
II without the assistance of the Gamemaster of the DTDHP Game.
In Step 6 of Figure 6.5, the Adversary Assistant II declares that it is ready
to go for an attack against the victim AAuF. In Step 7, the solver mathe-
matician in the DTDHP Game declares that it is ready to solve a challenge.
In Step 8, the Gamemaster of the DTDHP Game sends a challenge (gy
′
)
to the solver mathematician. In Step 9, the Gamemaster of AKMA Game
II forwards the same challenge to Adversary Assistant II. This step cor-
responds to Step 4 in Figure 8 of Paper IV. To win AKMA Game II, in
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Step 11, the Adversary Assistant II must return an AKMA message, which
corresponds to Step 10 in Figure 8 of Paper IV. The AKMA message must
include a response Z ′ = gy′ab. In Step 12, the solver mathematician for-
wards (Z ′)b−1 as a response to the original challenge in the DTDHP Game.
It is straightforward to see that the Adversary Assistant II wins AKMA
Game II if and only if the solver mathematician wins the DTDHP Game.
Since DTDHP is hard, the DTDHP solver mathematician cannot win the
DTDHP game. Therefore, there cannot be any adversary who can win
AKMA Game II. Consequently, no adversary can exist against the real
AKMA that does not know a and has access to somebody who knows b
and can return gm
′ab when challenged with gm
′
.
(3) Adversary knows neither a nor b: If the adversary knows neither
a nor b then the adversary can be modelled by either of the two other
adversaries discussed previously in this section. This is because anything
such an adversary can do can also be done by an adversary in AKMA Game
I and also in AKMA Game II.
“Privacy of Usage” Requirement Fulfilled
The “Privacy of Usage” requirement is fulfilled due to the following reasons:
1. The AApF and AAuF do not interact.
2. A user does not reveal AApF-specific information (e.g., the identity of the
AApF, SPUID) to the AAuF.
3. The AAuF cannot link the content of messages exchanged between the UE
and AApF with the content of the messages exchanged between the UE
and AAuF.
The reasons are explained in Section 5.3 of Paper IV in more detail.
“Identity Unlinkability” Requirement Fulfilled
The “Identity Unlinkability” requirement is fulfilled due to the following reasons:
1. The SPUID is not associated with any alternative identity/artefact known
by the AApF; if two SPUIDs are different, everything else (e.g., gmb, gmba,
and gab) in the protocol associated with those SPUIDs are different.
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2. The AApF cannot link the content of messages exchanged between the UE
and AApF with the content of the messages exchanged between the UE
and AAuF.
These reasons are explained in Section 5.3 of Paper IV in more detail.
6.3 Discussion
Both the normal-mode and privacy-mode AKMA can fulfil most of the AKMA
requirements that are listed in Paper IV. However, a few of the requirements
are fulfilled only by the normal-mode but not the privacy-mode AKMA. Also,
a few requirements can be fulfilled only by the privacy-mode but not by the
normal-mode AKMA. Neither of the modes can fulfil Requirement 19: “Pushed
bootstrapping”. This is because new modes of AKMA are required to fulfil this
requirement. There are some requirements which neither our normal-mode nor
privacy-mode AKMA can fulfill, but separate procedures can be embedded in
our normal-mode and/or privacy-mode AKMA to fulfil those requirements. We
have discussed which requirements can be fulfilled by which mode at length in
Section 6 of Paper IV.
Having a solution for privacy-mode AKMA, mobile network operators can
offer premium service to privacy-cautious consumers. Our scheme could be ex-
tended in the future by, e.g., including re-keying of secret keys that are known
only by the UE or by the AAuF. Future work could also include formal security
analysis, implementation, and standardisation of our scheme.
6.3.1 Current Status of AKMA Study
Since the writing of Paper IV, the AKMA study [69] has evolved further. Ver-
sion 16.0.0 of the AKMA study, which came out in December 2019, presents the
evaluation of proposed solutions and a list of recommendations (as conclusions
of the study) for devising a normative AKMA solution. The full list of recom-
mendations and conclusions can be found in Clause 6 of the AKMA study [69].
Following the recommendations, in July 2020, the first version of AKMA spec-
ification was published in 3GPP TS 33.535 [124]. Please note that in AKMA
specification, corresponding entities of AAuF, AApF, and TID are known by
different names.
At the time of writing this, the AKMA study, 3GPP TR 33.835 [69], has
not introduced any new key issues (i.e., no new requirements are added) in ad-
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dition to those considered in Paper IV. The study recommended using implicit
bootstrapping (Solutions 15, 19, and 24 in 3GPP TR 33.835 [69]) as the basis
of normative work. The AKMA specification in TS 33.535 [124] is created based
on implicit bootstrapping. The use of implicit bootstrapping has addressed two
of the AKMA requirements (Requirements 13 and 14 in Table 1 of Paper IV)
that we identified as missing in the AKMA study. Requirement 12, which we
identified as missing in Table 1 of Paper IV, is also fulfilled due to the use of the
Network Exposure Function (NEF) of 5G.
The resulting AKMA, as specified in TS 33.535, does not address the two ad-
ditional privacy requirements we have identified in Paper IV, i.e., Requirements
21 and 22 in Table 1. This is because, in AKMA specification, the AApF and the
AAuF directly communicate. Consequently, the AAuF knows which AApF the
user uses, i.e., requirement 21 in Table 1 of Paper IV is not fulfilled. According to
the specifications, the TID may be reused across multiple AApFs. Therefore, the
requirement of identity unlinkability (Requirement 22 in Table 1 of Paper IV)
would not be fulfilled. The specifications also do not give any guidelines about
what other parameters, along with application key and expiry time, the AAuF
is allowed to send to the AApF. The requirement of identity unlinkability may
also not be fulfilled if the AAuF sends linkable information of one user to two
AApFs.
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(9) Challenge: Y ′ = gy
′
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(14) WIN if Z′ = gy
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otherwise LOSE
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possible to do in
the AKMA world
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- Does not know a
- Target is to masquerade
as victim UE
(1) Set up the game: b, ga
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the AKMA world
...
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′
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(7) WIN if Z′ = gm
′ab,
otherwise LOSE
Figure 6.4: AKMA Game II.
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Gamemaster sends Z = gmab to
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game resumes from Step (3)
...
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(9) Challenge: Y ′ = gy
′
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the AKMA world, except the
Gamemaster does not play the
role of the victim AAuF
(11) Guess: Z′
(14) WIN if Z′ = gy
′ab,
otherwise LOSE
Figure 6.5: Winning DTDHP Game by Simulating AKMA Game II.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
A user in a cellular network needs to be allowed to roam around with a wireless
user device seamlessly and to be billed accurately for the services the user uses.
These characteristics imply that the networks need to handle identities of a user
in ways which are distinctive from other networks. For example, the network
must know the long-term identity, e.g., IMSI or SUPI, before the network allows
a user to use any services. Such requirements from the side of networks pose
threats to the privacy of the user.
Since the early days of cellular networks, designers have been aware of many
threats. Most of the known threats were mitigated since the second generation
of cellular networks by leveraging the use of digital radio signal and modern
cryptography. Also, throughout the evolution of cellular networks, some new
threats have emerged. Most of these threats have been mitigated. However,
some of the known threats were not mitigated due to a low benefit-cost ratio.
As a whole, the thesis contributes to the effort of making cellular networks
more privacy-friendly. Our contributions can be put into two categories. The first
category focuses on solving an old privacy problem – defeating IMSI catchers. We
contribute by proposing a novel solution, fixing problems in existing proposals,
and proposing a combination of existing proposals with a standardised solution.
The second category focuses on privacy in a new sub-system of the 5G network.
We contribute by pointing out privacy problems in the new sub-system. We also
propose solutions to these problems.
More specifically, in the first category of our contributions, we have looked
into one of the vulnerabilities related to the privacy of long-term identity, IMSI,
of a cellular network user. The vulnerability lies in the procedures that user
equipment uses to identify itself in GSM, 3G, and LTE – the user sends the long-
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term identity, IMSI, in plaintext. Adversaries, who are known as IMSI catchers,
exploit this vulnerability in the identification procedures. Mechanisms towards
fixing the vulnerability in the identification procedures have constituted a major
part of this thesis – Paper I,Paper II, and Paper III.
In 5G standards, the identification procedure does not have the same vul-
nerability as the identification procedures in GSM, 3G, and LTE have. This
is because the 5G standards have fixed the vulnerability. The fix uses public-
key cryptography – the user equipment encrypts the long-term identity of the
subscriber using the public key of the home network and sends the resulting ci-
phertext to the serving network. Paper I presents an alternative solution to fix
the vulnerability using a different approach. The 5G standards were finalised
after Paper I was published. However, the identification procedures of GSM, 3G,
and LTE still have the vulnerability. Paper II and Paper III propose solutions
to fix the vulnerability. Furthermore, we have identified a new privacy problem
in a new sub-system, known as AKMA, of the 5G network. We have proposed a
solution to solve the identified privacy problem in Paper IV.
In Paper I, we have presented a solution towards fixing the vulnerability in
the identification procedure of 5G using identity-based encryption. The solution
to defeating IMSI catchers is extended into a mutual authentication protocol
between the user equipment and its serving network. The mutual authentication
protocol is suitable in certain use cases, e.g., smart factories, of 5G. In Paper I, we
have also discussed the situations in which the mutual authentication is preferable
to the traditional AKA protocol. One usability issue of the solution is that a user
cannot move its USIM from one mobile equipment to another while roaming. An
avenue of future work would be to solve this usability issue.
Paper II improves pseudonym-based solutions [4, 60, 62, 103] towards defeat-
ing IMSI catchers in 3G and LTE networks. In pseudonym-based solutions that
we improved, the home network frequently chooses new pseudonyms and sends
to the user equipment. The user equipment uses pseudonyms (instead of IMSI)
to identify itself to the serving network. The user equipment prefers using a
pseudonym that was received later to a pseudonym that was received earlier.
The pseudonym-based solution relies on symmetric-key cryptography, and the
solution is transparent to the serving network, which reduces the computational
cost in the home network and also reduces the effort needed to patch serving
networks while deploying the solution.
In Paper II, we have shown that one of the vulnerabilities of hitherto-
published pseudonym-based solutions can be exploited into mounting a DDoS
attack that can cause serious damage to the HN by using a modest amount of
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resources. The attack de-synchronises pseudonyms between the user equipment
and its home network, and hence, when the user equipment sends a pseudonym,
the HN cannot identify the user equipment correctly. In Paper II, we have pre-
sented a solution that fixes the vulnerability and defeats the DDoS attack.
In Paper III, we have presented a solution to defeat IMSI catchers that attack
a 5G user by downgrading the user to LTE or 3G networks. This solution is an
extension of the solution presented in Paper II. Besides, it leverages 5G AKA to
fix the vulnerability that a malicious SN could use to mount an attack on a home
network to de-synchronise pseudonyms of users of the home network. Leveraging
5G AKA also enables a user equipment to re-synchronise pseudonyms if they get
de-synchronised due to some erroneous situation, e.g., memory corruption in the
user equipment or in the home network. Some of the implementation issues of
this solution are subject to further studies. For example, it needs to be studied
which parts of the solution should be implemented in the mobile equipment and
which parts should be implemented in the USIM.
In the second category of our contributions (Paper IV), we have looked into
a sub-system of the 5G network, known as Authentication and Key Management
for Applications (AKMA), which extends and evolves two earlier services that
3GPP specified for previous generations of mobile systems. Those earlier services
are GBA (Generic Bootstrapping Architecture) and BEST (Battery Efficient Se-
curity for Very Low Throughput Machine Type Communication Devices). When
Paper IV was published, the first version of AKMA was still under the process of
standardisation. In Paper IV, we have first analysed potential AKMA require-
ments vs GBA and BEST requirements. We have identified two new privacy
requirements that could be useful to protect the privacy of user transactions
with the AKMA Application Function (AApF) against, e.g., an insider attacker
in the home network of that user. Second, we have developed a privacy mode
for AKMA that fulfils those new requirements. Having this kind of solution, mo-
bile network operators can offer premium service to privacy-cautious consumers.
Our scheme could be extended in the future by, e.g., including rekeying of master
keys. Future work could also include formal security analysis, implementation,
and standardisation of our scheme.
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